Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

Spring 5-22-2014

Exploring Connections Between Efforts to Restrict
Same-Sex Marriage and Surging Public Opinion
Support for Same-Sex Marriage Rights: Could Efforts
to Restrict Gay Rights Help to Explain Increases in
Public Opinion Support for Same-Sex Marriage?
Samuel Everett Christian Dunlop
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Studies
Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Dunlop, Samuel Everett Christian, "Exploring Connections Between Efforts to Restrict Same-Sex Marriage
and Surging Public Opinion Support for Same-Sex Marriage Rights: Could Efforts to Restrict Gay Rights
Help to Explain Increases in Public Opinion Support for Same-Sex Marriage?" (2014). Dissertations and
Theses. Paper 1785.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1784

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Exploring Connections Between Efforts to Restrict Same-Sex Marriage and Surging Public
Opinion Support for Same-Sex Marriage Rights: Could Efforts to Restrict Gay Rights Help
to Explain Increases in Public Opinion Support for Same-Sex Marriage?

by
Samuel Everett Christian Dunlop

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
Political Science

Thesis Committee:
Kim Williams, Chair
Richard Clucas
David Kinsella

Portland State University
2014

Abstract
Scholarly research on the subject of the swift pace of change in support for same-sex
marriage has evolved significantly over the last ten years. The shift has gone beyond the
scholarship’s initial description amongst demographic groups on how opinion has changed
on gay rights issues, like same-sex marriage, to an examination of why the change has
occurred. A great deal of the initial research on the topic seemed to focus on demographic
traits that suggested a greater propensity toward support for same-sex marriage as time went
on. Is the existent literature sufficient to explain why such a dramatic change in public
opinion has occurred in the United States? My goal in this paper is to explore the plausibility
that electoral events and the public dialogue/debate that surround them have accelerated the
impact described in the four predominant theories, cohort succession, contact theory, intracohort
theory, and media exposure.
This paper includes three separate hypotheses to explore the possible connections
between efforts to restrict gay rights at the ballot box and the ever-increasing support for
same-sex marriage in public opinion polls. The results provide some preliminary indication
that there are plausible connections between individual statewide efforts to restrict gay rights
and increases in national public opinion support for same-sex marriage.
The first analysis examines electoral events concerning gay rights in states where
these issues have faced voters most frequently; California, Maine, and Oregon. The first
hypotheses posits a potential connection between exposure to gay rights at the ballot box
and greater support for gay rights in subsequent elections concerning gay rights in the same
state. No clear or consistent pattern of support emerges for successive electoral measures
i

concerning gay rights where voters have been previously exposed to gay rights question in an
electoral context.
The second analysis explores national public opinion support for same-sex
marriage as statewide ballot measures increase in popularity across the United States. The
second hypotheses posits a connection between an increase in statewide electoral events
concerning questions of same-sex marriage and an increase in national public opinion
support for same-sex marriage with state-to-nation diffusion occurring and prodding upward
national public opinion support for same-sex marriage simultaneously. The hypotheses is
confirmed by data that suggests as election events on same-sex marriage increase across the
United States at the state level, so too increases national public opinion support for same-sex
marriage.
The third analysis explores the rate of change in support for legal same-sex
marriage across the three states where gay rights referenda and ballot initiatives have been
most frequent; it posits that in states where voters have greater familiarity with gay rights at
the ballot because of previous exposure to them, their support will be greater over time than
public opinion measured in other states that have similar political cultures but have not faced
the same level of electoral activity on gay rights. The final hypothesis is inconclusive because
of the fluid nature of the same-sex marriage debate in the universe of states within the
United States. States are handling this salient issue in a number of ways; some legislatures
now seem to be taking steps to legalize same-sex marriage statutorily; others may take no
action to propel the provision of same-sex marriage equality or end constitutional bans on
the practice; while another group of states are leaving activists to litigate the policy in Federal
ii

courts or shift the debate toward statewide popular votes on the issue of authorizing samesex marriage at the ballot box via ballot initiative or referendum.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

There has been a torrent of news surrounding same-sex civil rights since 2008;
public opinion has surged in support for same-sex rights to majority levels, the number of
states recognizing same-sex relationships has more than doubled since 2008, the military
has ended its “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, and a sitting U.S. president personally
endorsed the right for same-sex couples to legally marry. This paper strives to examine
the quick rate of change in public support for same-sex marriage by examining why
public opinion has changed, not simply how it has changed. More specifically, I posit the
prospect that increased civic and political dialogue on the topic of same-sex marriage has
driven up the support for same-sex marriage because of the topic’s salience in pop culture,
politics, and electoral politics. President Obama’s formal endorsement of marriage
equality may serve as an interesting allegory on this phenomenon that has taken place
over the last few years, the notion that more and more people who have not supported
gay and legal right to marry, have changed their minds. President Obama did so in an
interview conducted in the Oval Office with interviewer Robin Roberts of ABC News,
who came out of the closet late in 2013. In Roberts’ interview with the President on May
9, 2012, he said:
I have to tell you that over the course of several years as I have talked to friends
and family and neighbors when I think about members of my own staff who are in
incredibly committed monogamous relationships, same-sex relationships, who are
raising kids together, when I think about those soldiers or airmen or Marines or
1

sailors who are out there fighting on my behalf and yet feel constrained, even now
that Don't Ask Don't Tell is gone, because they are not able to commit themselves
in a marriage, at a certain point I’ve just concluded that for me personally it is
important for me to go ahead and affirm that I think same sex couples should be
able to get married. (Roberts, 2012)

President Obama’s announcement marked an important shift in tone for the debate about
the advancement of gay and lesbian rights in the United States. Even if his support, as
some critics have suggested (Goodwin, 2012) was more politically and morally based
than policy-centered, as the first President to formally adopt a pro-marriage equality
stance, activists and supporters had a uniquely visible ally in their quest on behalf of
same-sex couples. However, perhaps more telling than President Obama’s “evolution” on
the issue of whether or not same-sex partners should be entitled to a right to marry, was
the way he articulated his support for them. Obama discussed his view in the context of
the same-sex people he knows and works with. Obama also discussed how at, some point,
his views had changed and evolved; like many other Americans, U.S. Senate candidate
Obama did not support the right of same-sex couples to marry but, in 2004, he did
support the notion of same-sex civil unions (Curry , 2012). President Obama’s personal
contact with homosexuals and his subsequent change of attitude toward same-sex
marriage exemplify many of the phenomena at work that I will feature and describe in
this analysis.
Scholarly research on the subject of the swift pace of change in support for samesex marriage has evolved significantly over the last ten years. The shift has gone beyond
the scholarship’s initial description amongst demographic groups on how opinion has
2

changed on gay rights issues, like same-sex marriage, to an examination of why the
change has occurred. A great deal of the initial research on the topic seemed to focus on
demographic traits that suggested a greater propensity toward support for same-sex
marriage as time went on (Bowman, K. & O’Keefe, B., 2004; Brewer, 2003; Lewis, G.,
2005; Haeberle, 1999; Haider-Markel, 2000; Wilcox, C. & Norrander, B., 2002; Yang, A.,
1997). More contemporary social science research focuses on why attitudes have changed
so dramatically toward support for same-sex marriage with a predominant focus on
generational attitude distinctions, contact with gays and lesbians, exposure to media, and
intracohort change as alternative explanations at play that may help to explain the sudden
shift in public opinion (Becker, 2012; Baunach, 2011; Brewer, 2003; Sherkat, PowellWilliams, Maddox, & de Vries, 2011; Sherkat, de Vries, & Creek, 2010; Schafer, C. &
Shaw, G., 2009). President Obama’s example, in this way, may be illustrative; what traits,
both innate, and those acquired over time might have foretold his change of heart? What
about the potential clues that his age, race, education, home, religious affiliation, or
income might afford to such a prediction?
Scholarly literature and public opinion data give researchers on this topic a rich
collection of statistics and demographic information that help to unlock the potential
likelihood of not just those who are more prone to have changed their opposition to samesex marriage, but those who may have been more prone to have held more supportive
attitudes and opinions about gays and same-sex couples’ rights from the beginning. Of
course, the President of the United States is no ordinary survey respondent or citizen; his
role and responsibilities require careful consideration of the ramifications of every public
3

position he takes. However, what seems missing from the discussion about how public
opinion has changed on the topic of same-sex marriage is a focused reflection on why
public opinion has changed and whether or not specific events have served as catalyst for
this change. Some of the academic discussion of recent years has focused on the notion
that generational replacement, sometimes called cohort succession – a topic I will explore
in greater detail later- (Baunach 2012; Sherkat et. al, 2011; Treas, 2002), is responsible
for the gradual change in support toward majority levels. In other words, as older more
conservative people have passed on, they are replaced by younger more liberally oriented
individuals more amenable to the provision of same-sex marriage rights. Similarly, other
academic discussion has cleverly described the changes in attitudes, of individuals both
within and across generational groups, as intracohort change (Baunach, 2010, 2012;
Treas, 2002). Intracohort change describes the tendency to have changed an attitude
toward a topic, like same-sex marriage rights within one generational group or across
generational cohorts. Other academic and opinion discussion has centered on the power
of personal relationships with gays and lesbians to cause an attitude shift amongst those
who work, live near, or may be related to gays and lesbians (Becker & Scheufele, 2011;
Brewer, 2008). This potential power of personal interaction and familiarity with gays and
lesbians to change attitudes is referred to within the literature and opinion research as
contact theory. The tendency for outgroups to be humanized- and over time accepted because of individual experience in a work place, or school, or other personal contact is
well documented in social science research in areas like race, religion, or other
antagonistic social and demographic groups (Allport, 1954). Finally, other research has
reached, somewhat unsuccessfully, to trace entertainment, news media exposure, and
4

high profile events as attention-seizing milestones that have captured the public attention
and forced a collective dialogue on the topic of homosexuality and rights (Becker &
Scheufele, 2009; Brewer, 2008; Sherkat et. al, 2008). In other words, as entertainment
has portrayed more and more homosexuals and topics concerning homosexuality, some
scholarly literature has contended that people have been forced to confront and
subsequently re-evaluate their attitudes on the topic. Similarly, this line of academic work
that focuses on the roles that media and elites cues play in mediating public opinion also
contends that news events, like the beating and murder of Matthew Shepard, or the
installation of an openly gay Episcopal bishop demonstrate that the debate about gays and
lesbians and public policy supporting their interests and rights was no longer taboo or
always politically toxic. What was once considered taboo, immoral, or distasteful as a
general topic of discussion was emerging as a common topic featured on the evening
national network news programs. Later, as I summarize the alternative explanations for
the surge in public support for gay rights and same-sex marriage, I broadly refer to this
line of academic inquiry as elite cues. These lines of inquiry are central to my discussion
about the evolution of the same-sex marriage rights debate in the United States. Is the
existent literature sufficient to explain why such a dramatic change in public opinion has
occurred in the United States? My goal in this analysis is to determine the plausibility
that electoral events and the public dialogue/debate that surround them have accelerated
the impact described in the four predominant theories, cohort succession, contact theory,
intracohort theory, and media exposure.

5

This phenomenon, specifically as it relates to the public debate and its role in
influencing individuals within society, is known throughout social science as diffusion
(Rogers, 2003). Initial research into the notion of diffusion examined how an idea might
spread across social systems and geographic regions and gain salience with certain
groups over time, with some small groups adopting early an idea or “innovation” early,
slightly larger groups adopting later, and final groups lagging behind; its primary
proponent was Everett Rogers who published “Diffusion of Innovations” in 1962 (Rogers,
1962). Diffusion helps to explain how an idea or innovation may expand across social
networks and through social institutions (Soule & Strange, 1998). Additional research has
found that states are prone to diffusion on policy matters, too; individual states may be
more or less likely to adopt an idea, like restriction of same-sex marriage, dependent on
the economic and political conditions of the individual state along with whatever the
specific issue at hand proposes (Gray, 1973). Serious public debate in the news on the
topic of same-sex marriage has emerged as early as the early 1990s with the Hawaii
Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Lewin (1993), which acknowledged the potential
violation of 14th Amendment guarantees of equal protection when a group of same-sex
couples petitioned the denial of their application for marriage licenses. Americans may
have been forced to entertain varying narratives on the topic of same-sex relations,
including everything from the legality of both sodomy and marriage since the early to
mid 1990s. However, given the diffusion of media outlets and platforms for current
events, it may now be easier to tune-out this information or to self-select those outlets
that fit an individual’s ideological bias. The gay rights discussion has proliferated from
the state level to the federal level- but in its earliest forms, largely emerged in debate at
6

the municipal level in the form of opposition to adoption of anti-discrimination
employment ordinances based on sexual orientation (Stone, 2012). Only in the late 1990s
did state level initiatives begin to gain popularity at the ballot box and thus garner large
scale public attention, potentially attributable to the passage of the Defense of Marriage
Act (1996), and also perhaps due to the political potency of gay marriage as a socially
divisive “wedge” issue.
Gay marriage came before voters at the state level 31 times in 30 states between
1998-2012 (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013); only once out of the 31
times did voters reject defining marriage solely as a union between a man and a woman. I
use the trajectory of this debate, particularly at the state level, to posit that there is a
demonstrable link between the ongoing debate about same-sex marriage and increasing
public support as demonstrated in recent public opinion polls and scholarly analysis. It is
my contention that intracohort change, cohort succession, media events, and contact
theory are highly intercorrelated and all play a role in the rapid surge in support for samesex marriage. However, the predominant explanations for the quick rate-of-change I
found in my research seem to lack a thorough examination of political and electoral
events that have heightened the debate and attention paid toward the civic debate about
same-sex marriage policy. If we conceptualize statewide events concerning same-sex
marriage as the introduction of a new idea, whether it is an effort to restrict gay rights at
the ballot box, court rulings, or policy debates, it seems plausible that state level events
and legislation have prodded national opinion toward greater support for same-sex
marriage. Indeed, none of the scholarly literature features an analysis of the potential
7

impact that these referenda and ballot initiatives themselves play in the formation or
evolution of public opinion and public debate on same-sex marriage.
In his 2008 book Value War, Paul Brewer asserts that there is a relationship
between public debate and public opinion- where each impacts the other as salient topics
rise to the surface in public and political spheres. My goal in this project is to contribute
another pillar to the ongoing discussion about how and why public opinion is changing
rapidly on the topic of same-sex marriage rights- to explore whether or not significant
public debate triggered by electoral events and contact theory accelerates the impact on
the four theories I found most prominent in my literature review. Additionally, the
aforementioned predominant explanations are multi-correlated and potentially could be
subsumed under each other if configured differently (Baunach, 2011). However, these
alternative explanations fail to account for the rapid change in support for same-sex
marriage in relation to past and concurrent electoral activity on gay rights. The majority
of the fiercely fought campaigns in the last ten years have emerged at the state level as
voters have been confronted with the chance to preserve the status-quo, or
constitutionally and statutorily restrict the definition of marriage between a man and a
woman. Only in the last few years have voters in select states been asked to approve the
provision of same-sex marriage rights at the ballot. The question remains: how have the
campaigns themselves- as the media attention and public dialogue that emerged because
of them – impacted mass public opinion on same-sex marriage?

8

Chapter 2: Research Question & Methodology
As of early 2013 the United States is now well beyond its second full decade
where discussions about gay rights have occupied an ongoing and evolving discussion of
public debate. Simultaneously, the panoply of public opinion polls released over the last
few years have demonstrated an increase in public support for same-sex marriage. There
are a variety of competing and interdependent alternate explanations for the quick rate of
change in public support for gay rights, in particular same-sex marriage, as I will discuss
in greater detail in my review of the academic literature. However, little attention has
been given to the potential role that the public debate within state referenda and ballot
initiatives on gay rights could have played on public opinion on issues like same-sex
marriage. The greater historical focus, as revealed in my literature review, has been on
the demographics that portend support for gay rights and same-sex marriage, along with
the combination of alternative explanations like cohort succession, intracohort change,
contact theory, and elite cues that I discuss in greater length later (Brewer, 2003; Becker
& Scheufele, 2011; Brewer P.R. & Wilcox, C. 2005; Ellison, C.G. & Ramos-Wada, A.I.,
9

2011; Gaines, N. & Garand, J., 2010; Haider-Markel, D. & Joslyn, M.R. 2008; Olson,
L.R., Cadge, W., & Harrison, J.T. 2006; Sherkat, D, Powell-Williams, M., Maddox, G. &
de Vries, K. 2011). Is it possible that as the public has confronted these initiatives and
referenda, that the debate surrounding each has diminished opposition to same-sex
marriage in the aggregate? In other words, is it possible that efforts to restrict gay
rights via ballot initiatives have over time caused an increase in public support for gay
rights like same-sex marriage? Examples abound in recent political history of what has
been called “the backlash hypothesis” where legal and political repercussions stem from a
controversial legal or political action (Klarman, 2004; Ball, C.A. 2006). Might the
strength of the gay rights movement in the United States owe itself to backlash politics
propagated through diffusion at the state level? Some view the political ascent of Ronald
Reagan and the Republican take-over of congress in 1994 as example of backlash politics
in response to the liberal policies of 20th century presidents like Franklin Roosevelt and
Lyndon Johnson (Lind, 2012). Is it then possible that the backlash hypothesis applies to
the 2003 Massachusetts Goodridge decision that legalized same-sex marriage there and
was a catalyst for national and statewide electoral action on restricting gay rights?
Moreover, does it seem possible that growing acceptance for gay rights and same-sex
marriage were born from the ashes of the wildfire of referenda and constitutional bans
that took place after 2003?
I explore these questions in the coming pages as I examine the dual evolution of
public opinion on gay rights and the proliferation of statewide ballot initiatives and
referenda on same-sex marriage. I will first trace some of the major themes present in
10

scholarly literature that have focused attention on the contour of public opinion and the
debate over gay rights, most specifically same-sex marriage where such literature was
available. I will examine the most prominent alternate explanations behind the quick
change in support for same-sex marriage cited within this literature. As a backdrop to the
other previous academic work that has been written on the topic, I also trace the structure
of public opinion on the topic of same-sex marriage and how it has evolved, as well as
the other prevalent patterns and trends within the literature. Ultimately, I seek to
determine if sufficient evidence exists to support the notion that statewide ballot
initiatives and referenda on the topic of same-sex marriage have acted as a lightning rod
for public attention and increased support for these rights with the public over time, most
specifically in states with action on gay rights in contrast to states who have not litigated
questions of gay rights as frequently at the ballot box. Previous literature has suggested
that state referenda and ballot initiatives may impact issues that the electorate uses to
make candidate assessments on the same ballot (Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith 2008).
Additional academic literature has posited that statewide institutions of direct democracy
give voters potential heuristical cues about how they may make their choices for
individual presidential candidates in the same election context (Nicholson, 2005). If vote
priming exists via direct democracy within ballot initiatives and referenda in statewide
elections during the context of presidential elections, it also seems plausible that the
priming effects and issue salience may linger beyond the immediate context of a specific
election.

11

Thus, I have conceptualized three separate ways to test the viability of the
relationship between efforts to vote on gay and lesbian rights and their potential to
increase public support over time. These hypotheses are based on a synthesis of the
existent alternate explanations I found within scholarly literature on the topic; specifically,
I leverage Paul Brewer’s (2008) claim that there is a relationship between public debate
and public opinion on gay rights, one where a combination of media coverage and current
events interplay to impact public opinion and influence how Americans have thought
about gay rights. I take Brewer’s claim beyond his consideration of presidential speeches,
sermons, tv series, and television news to expand public debate a degree further by
including the civic debate surrounding gay ballot initiatives and referenda questions in
several states as measured by public opinion.
H1: In states where issues of gay rights have appeared at the ballot box most
frequently, popular support for gay rights will show a general trend of increased
electoral support for initiatives meant to preserve, provide, or stop the potential
restriction of gay rights in the future, in each successive referenda over time and
over the previous electoral event.

H2: National public opinion poll data on support for same-sex marriage should
increase over time as statewide ballot initiatives begin and increase in the United
States; investigation of successive time periods with lesser and higher
concentrations of electoral initiatives on gay civil rights will reveal sharp
increases in support as forced democratic and political dialogue on the topic
ensues over time.

H3: The rate of change in support for legal same-sex marriage in the three states
where gay rights referenda have been more frequent will be greater than in states
where political culture is similar but has not seen the same level of referenda
incidence on gay rights, including same-sex marriage.

12

Additional scholarly inquiry might examine whether or not the converse of the above
hypotheses may also prove true, particularly for Hypothesis 1: if states have had no
history of anti-gay referenda or ballot initiatives, might it suggest less support for gay
rights overall as time evolves, or perhaps something unique and distinct about the state’s
political culture or institutions? More broadly, it seems plausible that were it not for the
most significant legal events like Baehr v. Lewin (1993) and Goodridge v. Massachusetts
(2003)- legal decisions that propelled the notion of same-sex marriage into the national
dialogue - that the torrent of electoral and ballot initiatives would not have fostered the
cross currents and changes to public support necessary to propel the gay rights movement
as far as it has come in the past fifteen years. Despite same-sex marriage’s relatively high
salience in the present political climate, gay rights questions at the ballot box have grown
from relative obscurity over the last thirty years; the range of statewide electoral
initiatives and referenda concerning gay and lesbian rights, even outside the context of
same-sex marriage, have spanned hundreds of elections at the municipal and state level.
The political and public opinion landscape has changed significantly since the referenda
and ballot initiatives on gay rights began in the late 1970s. However, I expect that the
final two hypotheses will generate results in my data analysis that are more likely to
confirm the relationship between the aggregate public dialogue created by these statewide
initiatives and increase support as measured in public opinion polls nationally and
statewide over time.

13

Chapter 3: Data & Measures
I use data from several sources to evaluate the potential impact of state referenda
on public attitudes and opinions. The first source comes from the Secretaries of State
offices for California, Maine, and Oregon. I utilize these states’ electoral behavior as a
potential indicator for changes in public support for gay rights after exposure to the
public dialogue surrounding previous electoral campaigns geared toward gay rights.
California, Maine, and Oregon are unique because they are some of the only states in the
Union to have held multiple statewide elections on policy issues directly related to gay
rights. In conjunction with my first hypothesis I use election results as a potential
barometer to evaluate changes in public opinion, and thus public support, for matters
concerning gay rights. I use statewide data in these cases because they are the best
potential indicator for the residual exposure effect that public debate surrounding
campaigns geared toward gay rights. Because there are, and have been, no national
referenda on gay rights, states prove a potential, albeit crude, gauge for the type of
change that may reveal the power of public debate geared toward gay rights to change
attitudes and actions in an electoral context. Analyses of the evolution of public opinion
and state-by-state polling data have been conducted, although for slightly different aim,
using complex quantitative methodologies using R and programs like SPSS (see Gelman
and Bafumi, 2004; Flores & Barclay, 2013). A detailed example of multilevel logistic
regression models for the estimation of state level opinion data from national opinion
data samples is offered by Park, Gelman, and Bafumi in 2004 that has become widely
14

referred to as “poststratification” (Bafumi, Gelman, and Park, 2004). The other more
method, which has been more dominant in analyses of statewide opinion data has been
called disaggregation. Lax and Phillips (2009) determined that multilevel regression and
postratification (MRP) were more accurate than the previously and more dominant model
for estimation developed by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) that pools large
numbers of national surveys and then disaggregates the data so as to calculate opinion
percentages by individual states. Lax and Phillips found in their research that MRP was
more effective based on the analysis of 100 surveys on gay rights issues in conjunction
with 1988 presidential election data (Lax & Phillips, 2009). Similarly, Flores and Barclay
used nearly identical methodologies in their 2013 research to address the state of opinion
in all fifty states of the Union and how each has changed since 2004 (Barclay & Flores,
2013).
While my analysis does not leverage the above techniques, I offer an initial
exploration on the topic to discern the value of any future research in this area. To my
knowledge, no specific attention has been paid toward the potential impact that electoral
and ballot initiatives have played in the shaping of public opinion on support for gay
rights, specifically same-sex marriage- or how efforts to restrict minority rights via ballot
box may, over time, actually instigate an increase in public support for those same rights
over time.

15

Table 1: Sources

Each of the methods employed is geared to explore the larger possibility that
efforts primarily geared toward restricting gay rights through referenda and ballot
initiatives have, somewhat ironically, lead to increased public support as measured
through public opinion polls. Each hypothesis explores the proposition that there is
diffusion occurring between either electoral or other high profile events (like court cases,
policy debates, etc.) in the states and thus impacting national public opinion; this
diffusion is examined in states where questions of gay rights have occurred most
frequently at the ballot box to determine if there is an initial connection between the
incidence of their occurrence and successive electoral events within the same state. I then
move to explore the prospect that the proliferation of gay rights electoral events within
the states may impact national public opinion over time. I specifically explore the
potential relationship between the number of electoral events that transpired amongst the
states and whether there was an increase in public support for same-sex marriage in the
16

wake of this potential diffusion occurring from state level electoral action on gay rights,
most frequently attempting to restrict them. Finally, I examine the actual statewide
opinion data in states where questions of gay rights have occurred at the ballot box most
frequently against a control group of states (Hypothesis III) where there is little, if any,
record of statewide electoral action related to gay rights. The final hypothesis seeks to
determine if there is a distinction in the contours of public opinion over the same period
of time within culturally similar states who have or have not engaged in statewide policy
debates at the ballot box over gay rights. If my data suggests that there is a distinction
between increased public support within states that have engaged in greater civic
dialogue about electoral activity centered around gay rights, further research into the
potential connection between the accelerated pace of change in public support for samesex marriage may help explain a phenomena that can instigate public support for policies
geared toward civil rights but have been historically taboo.

Methods in Hypothesis I:
To glean whether or not there is a connection between advances in support for gay
rights in states where electoral activity on those rights has been most pronounced, I
examine ballot referenda and initiatives concerning gay rights and their outcomes to
determine if successive support in electoral activity for gay rights has increased or
maintained momentum. Ultimately, to understand whether or not there is a connection
between efforts to restrict gay rights and increased support for them overall, individual
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states’ elections may serve as an effective barometer of this paper’s central research
question. If, indeed, support for gay rights increases, as measured by election outcomes,
successive elections and their outcomes on the same topic may prove an early key
indicator that that efforts to restrict gay rights actually propel support for those same
rights among a broader swath of the electorate.
I reclassify separate ballot measures and referenda questions based on two broad
categories: support for gay rights and opposition to gay rights. I trace the electoral
outcomes for all of these referenda questions based only on the ballot performance of the
initiatives in the support category.

California
In California’s statewide ballot measure history there have been four specific
propositions where gay rights have been at stake. These ballot propositions took place in
1978, 1986, 2000, and 2008. The 1978 Briggs Initiative, for example, attempted to ban
gays and lesbians from employment in California’s public educational system (Stone,
2012). In my reconfiguration of the data, votes for the Briggs Initiative are construed as
opposition to gay rights, where as votes in opposition to the proposition are configured as
support for gay rights. The second proposition included for California, Proposition 64, a
categorization of AIDS throughout California as a “communicable disease” for civic
purposes, which meant a virtual registry of those afflicted with the disease and possible
quarantine as a result. Many in the gay community viewed this proposed measure as a
mandatory outing of their disease and sexuality and feared the social implications of its
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passage, according to an Opinion editorial written by David L. Kip, Professor of Public
Policy at UC-Berkeley. (Kip, “LaRouche Turns To AIDS Politics.”) I interpreted votes
for the Proposition 64 as oppositional toward the provision of gay rights, while yes votes
were construed as a preservation of the status quo and privacy rights- or as supportive of
gay rights. The third proposition in California, Proposition 22, also known as the
“Knight Initiative”, was a statutory restriction of marriage as defined to mean those
marriages between two persons of the opposite sex. (Secretary of State, California, 2013);
I interpreted votes for the statutory restriction of marriage as oppositional to the provision
of gay rights, while no votes were interpreted as supportive of gay rights. Finally, the
fourth proposition was the 2008 Proposition 8, which constitutionally eliminated the right
of same-sex couples to marry via referedum; yes votes were interpreted as oppositional to
gay rights, where no votes were also interpreted as supportive of gay rights, even though
rejection of the Proposition would not have resulted in the provision of same-sex
marriage. This methodology holds throughout all of the ballot measures I use in the
three states that have most frequently addressed gay rights at the ballot box.

Oregon
Like California, the state of Oregon has been no stranger to ballot measures
concerning gay and lesbian rights, including same-sex marriage. While the electoral
flurry of activity concerning gay and lesbian rights did not begin until ten years after
California’s first ballot measure, Oregon was enveloped by ongoing contentious local and
statewide policy battles over gay rights, particularly notable was the resistance to anti19

discrimination ordinances that were adopted by municipal bodies in the late eighties and
early nineties (Stone, 2012). Voters in Oregon confronted five separate statewide
initiatives in the span between 1988 and 2004. The first came in 1988, Ballot Measure 8which revoked a ban on discrimination put into place by then Governor Neil Goldschmidt
(Secretary of State, Oregon). Ballot Measure 8 gave voters the opportunity to vote aye in
an effort to repeal the ban put into place by Governor Goldschmidt. Voters choosing to
vote no on Measure 8 have been configured as supportive of gay rights since their votes
would have allowed the Governor’s discrimination ban to remain in place.
In November of 1992 Oregon voters again faced a more broad statewide initiative,
Measure 9 geared toward the discouragement of homosexuality by the state government
and the prohibition of recognition of new protected classes of minority groups including
those based on “sexual orientation” or “sexual preference”, as read the state statute
(Secretary of State, Oregon 2013). I have configured yes votes on Measure 9 as
oppositional to gay rights since the measure intended to establish a standard via the
Oregon Department of Higher Education and public schools that “recognizes
homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism, and masochism as abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and
perverse…” (Secretary of State, Oregon). “No” votes on Measure 9 were configured as
supportive of gay rights since they intended to prevent adoption of the statute
discouraging homosexuality and other “behaviors.”
Only two years after Ballot Measure 9 failed would another measure emerge
specifically targeted toward the restriction of gay rights. In November of 1994, Oregon
voters faced Ballot Measure 12 , a statute geared toward the prohibition of the same
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prospective creation of classes of minority based on sexual preference, orientation, or
recognition of same-sex partnerships designated as “domestic partnerships” (Secretary of
State, Oregon, 2013). Ballot Measure 12 would have also decreed that no public funds be
spent in the promotion or approval of homosexuality. I have configured yes votes as
oppositional to gay rights since adoption of the statute would have eliminated the creation
and establishment of protections based on sexual orientation or same-sex partnerships. I
have interpreted no votes on Ballot Measure 12 as supportive of gay rights since rejection
of the proposed statute would have preserved the status quo and the state’s ability to craft
legal provisions and protections for homosexuals and same-sex partners.
Six years after the defeat of Ballot Measure 12 in Oregon, opponents of
homosexual rights again were successful in placement of a ballot measure before voters
intended to ensure that no state public schools, elementary or secondary, and community
colleges were involved in the “instruction of behaviors relating to homosexuality or
bisexuality shall not be presented in a public school in a manner which encourages,
promotes, or sanctions such behaviors” (Secretary of State, Oregon). Furthermore, the
statute went so far as to threaten the withdrawal of state financial funding from schools if
such instruction took place in abrogation or derogation of the statute. I have interpreted
yes votes on Measure 9 as oppositional to gay rights; I have also interpreted no votes on
the same measure as supportive of gay rights since the discriminatory policy would thus
be rejected if the majority of voters voted in the negative.
Finally, in November of 2004, Oregon voters faced the last statewide ballot
initiative geared toward the constitutional restriction of marriage as between two
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members of the opposite sex, “one man and one woman” (Secretary of State, Oregon).
Oregon was one of eleven states in November of 2004 to adopt constitutional bans on
same-sex marriage; . Voters who voted yes on Ballot Measure 36 authorized the adoption
of the state constitutional amendment, whereas voters who voted no were rejecting the
adoption of the constitutional amendment geared toward the definition of marriage as
between one man and one woman. I have thus interpreted yes votes as oppositional to gay
rights and no votes on Ballot Measure 36 as supportive of gay rights.
Oregon’s electoral history on gay rights illustrates and potentially bridges an
important relationship discussed in some of the scholarly literature about how the public
views and thinks about gay rights in the sphere of equality versus the sphere of morality.
Paul Brewer illustrates the emergent distinctions and cleavages in public between how
the public has viewed issues like the ban on gays in the military, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”,
and anti discrimination employment policies than their views on issues like same-sex
marriage. Brewer has contended that the public views these policies differently for
largely moral and religious reasons (Brewer, 2008). Oregon’s electoral record on gay
rights seems to illustrate the distinctions in attitude towards these issues.

Maine
In contrast to the other two states surveyed thus far, Maine started voting on gay
rights considerably later than both Oregon and California. Like Oregon, Maine has voted
on matters of gay rights five times over a span of sixteen years. In many ways, the type of
questions voters in Maine confronted on their ballots mirror the very same policy
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questions faced by voters in Oregon. I have clustered the voter groups in these races
again, as I have done in both California and Oregon, as voters who are supportive of gay
rights, and those who are oppositional in their electoral habits to gay rights. These
configurations are based on the policy goals of the ballot measure and on the electoral
choices and goals voiced by voters when they chose to adopt or reject each ballot
measure.
Maine voters faced the first ballot measure focused on gay rights in November of
1995. Question 1, while not explicitly about gay rights, asked voters whether or not to
prohibit the expansion of protected minority classes beyond the protection already
afforded to existent classes at the time. The measure posed the question: “Do you favor
the changes in Maine law limiting protected classifications, in future state and local laws
to race, color, sex, physical or mental disability, religion, age, national origin, familial
status and marital status, and repealing existing laws?” The law would, if passed, limit
the scope of protected classes by specifically enumerating them to the classes listed in
Question 1, effectively ending the expansion of any new protected classes, particularly to
homosexuals.
Because, like the other states already discussed, the potential expansion of these
classes would have meant that gays and lesbians may have gained additional legal
insulation from discrimination as a protected class, votes in favor, yes votes, have been
interpreted as votes in opposition to gay rights. Whereas opposition to Question 1 meant
that a prohibition on this type expansion would have stopped certain minority protection
and privileges; I have construed opposition to Question 1, because it would have allowed
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the potential for the proliferation of minority class protections for gays and lesbians, as
supportive of gay rights, despite its perpetuation of the status quo.
The second time Maine voters confronted gay rights at the ballot box was in
February of 1998. Voters in this election were asked whether or not to repeal a
nondiscrimination law that would have afforded protection from discrimination based on
sexual orientation in areas of employment, housing, public accommodation, and credit.
Votes in favor of the 1998 Question 1 proposition were signaling a policy desire to repeal
the nondiscrimination law, while voters who voted no were expressing a preference to
maintain the existent nondiscrimination law. Thus, I have interpreted votes in favor of
Question 1 as oppositional to gay rights since the initiative was geared toward
preservation of the ability to discriminate in certain public policy areas based on sexual
orientation; votes in opposition to the 1998 Question were interpreted as supportive of
gay rights as they would have maintained the legislative act meant to prohibit
discrimination.
Two years later Question 6 once again asked individuals to make a choice to
adopt or reject a legislative act geared toward protection against discrimination based on
sexual orientation in the areas of employment, housing, public accommodation, and
credit was placed on the November ballot in Maine. However, Question 6 asked voters
whether or not to ratify another legislative act expanding protections against
discrimination based on sexual orientation, rather than the repeal question placed on the
ballot two years prior. I have interpreted yes votes on Question 6 as supportive of gay
rights because it asked voters to affirm and ratify legislation adopted to protect against
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discrimination based on sexual orientation; no votes on Question 6 have been interpreted
as oppositional to gay rights since they would have rejected the antidiscrimination
legislation.
It would not be until 2009 when voters in Maine were again asked about gay
rights on their ballots. Maine had tackled legislative adoption of same-sex marriage
earlier in 2009 and then Governor John Baldacci signed the legislation into law. In
opposition to the state legislature’s action and the governor’s support in May, opponents
organized the November referendum to put the question to voters statewide in an off year
where no federal candidates were on the ballot. Question 1 was framed as a “People’s
Veto” of the state law passed by the legislature and governor that allowed same-sex
couples to marry. Because the vote was oriented toward repeal if successful, yes votes
have been interpreted as opposition to gay rights since they would have rescinded the
newly crafted ability for same-sex partners to have the various state legal benefits of
marriage. No votes on the 2009 Question 1 proposition have been configured as
supportive of gay rights since, if successful, the right to marry for same-sex couples
guaranteed by the legislature and governor would have been preserved.
Because the Maine voters affirmed and adopted Question 1 in 2009, the
legislation meant to establish same-sex marriage rights was rescinded. Three years later,
in 2012, a citizen initiative again asked Maine voters, this time in the context of a
presidential year election whether or not to pass “ An act to allow marriage licenses for
same-sex couples and protect religious freedom” (Maine, Secretary of State, 2013). In the
2012 Question 1, votes in support of the question, yes votes, have been interpreted as
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supportive of gay rights since same-sex marriage would be established in Maine if the
question was adopted; no votes were interpreted as oppositional to gay rights since the
status quo would have been maintained and same-sex marriage been inaccessible under
state law.

Table 2: Statewide Electoral Events
Year

Topic

Proposition #

Maine Gay Rights Referenda & Ballot Initiatives

1998
2000
2009
2012

Repeal of a nondiscrimination law based
on homosexuality
Ratification of a statute geared toward
protection against discrimination because
of homosexuality
People's veto of statute passed and
signed by governor granting same-sex
marriage
Allows Marriage Licenses for same-sex
couples

1
6
1
1

Source: Maine Secretary of State Office

California Gay Rights Referenda & Ballot Initiatives

Year
1978
1986

Topic

Question #

Attempts ban on employment for
homosexuals in California public
educational system
Classifies AIDS as a communcicable
disease; would require registry and
possible quarantine

6
64

2000

Defines marriage per state statute as
22
between two persons of the opposite sex

2008

Constitutionally eliminates the right of
same-sex couples to marriage

8

Source: California Secretary of State Office

Oregon Gay Rights Referenda & Ballot Initiatives

Year
1988
1992
1994
2000
2004

Topic

Measure #

Revokes ban on discrimination imposed
by governor
Government cannot facilitate, must
discourage homosexuality and other
"behaviors"
Amends constitution: government
cannot approve, create protected
classifications based on homosexuality
Prohibits public school instruction
encouraging, promoting, sanctioning
homosexual and bisexual behavior
Amends constitution: only marriage
between one man and one woman legally
recognized as marriage
Source: Oregon Secretary of State Office
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8
9
12
9
36

Methods in Hypothesis II: Examining National and State Public Opinion

For evaluation of my second hypothesis, that there is a connection between the
proliferation and state referenda and ballot initiatives on gay rights and increases in
national public support for same-sex marriage, I use data from several national opinion
polls to examine the potential relationship between the proliferation of gay rights ballot
initiatives and changes in the rate of change as measured in national public opinion polls.
I examine data points on attitudes across several national polls from major media and
opinion research groups including Gallup, ABC News, Pew, and NBC/Wall Street
Journal. I examine the rate of change in public opinion for each sample taken for each
polling organization or media agency over the course of time since they began asking
questions about attitudes toward the legality of same-sex marriage. The comprehensive
list of national opinion data that I collected can be found in Table 3.0-3.2 of the
Appendix; I utilized four national polling organizations and assembled more than 70
samples across those four organizations. While most of the polls were not consistent in
the duration between samples, the opinion trend and trajectory across the polls is
relatively similar over similar periods of time and the rate of change per year.

Ultimately, I examine the polling data in three distinct periods: one
between the advent of state ballot initiatives on same-sex marriage beginning in 1996 and
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ending in 2003, the second between 2004 and 2008, when the bulk of same-sex ballot
initiatives appeared on statewide ballots, and again in the period between 2008 to the
present, in the wake of significant national events in the gay rights movement more
largely, like the end of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, the President’s endorsement of gay
marriage, the heightened attention of the electoral victories for same-sex advocates at the
polls in Minnesota, Maryland, Maine, and Washington in the November 2012 elections,
and incredible media focus on high profile Supreme Court cases in March 2013 on the
constitutionality of gay right issues surrounding California’s Proposition 8 and the 1996
Defense of Marriage Act. I examine the rate of change in each individual poll for each
time period, average all the polls between each time period, and attempt to glean if the
rate of change in public opinion is greater in periods where electoral activity and, public
debate, and media attention has focused on same-sex marriage issues.

Methods in Hypothesis III: State Opinion Data and Political Culture

To distill the potential relationship between heightened referenda activity and
public opinion, I examine state level opinion data from a variety of sources and measure
it against states that have similar political culture, using Daniel Elazar’s political culture
classification system from his 1996 American Federalism: A View from the States.
Elazar’s political culture classification system has been used to analyze and interpret
variances in state behavior to common issues or challenges each confronts. I use Elazar’s
classification to test states with the greatest incidence of referenda or ballot initiatives on
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gay rights against a control group of states that have not endured the same level of public
debate or campaigns about same-sex marriage. Moreover, I seek to determine whether
states where the increased exposure and public dialogue that accompany statewide
campaigns, particularly in California, Maine, and Oregon, acts as a catalyst for fasterthan-average support, as measured in public-opinion polls for same-sex marriage in other
states.
To accomplish this task I assembled a volume of private opinion polling data
captured from a panoply of states (see page 36). Because a dearth of statewide polling
data exists prior to 2008, I examine only the time period of heightened same-sex marriage
activity between 2009-2013 to determine if my hypothesis is plausible. For specific years
where multiple polls were in the field in a given state, I examine the average of all the
polls for a given year and note with asterisks if the poll for that specific year was a
composite of multiple samples and/or polling companies. I then examine the local trend
and discern the average rate of change year-to-year, if possible. Given that there are some
years without any statewide opinion data on the topic of same-sex marriage, the local
trend line is limited because of the dearth of available data.
Elazar’s political culture classification system has been used to analyze and
interpret variances in state behavior and to understand common issues or challenges each
state confronts. In conjunction with his classification scale, Elazar also conceptualized
the states in the United States that had a sub-variant of his political culture, or, in some
cases, a combination of political subcultures. Elazar’s classification offers three broad
political subcultures that he purports are unique to American political culture and were
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formed from a “geology of political culture” that emanates from socioeconomic and
cultural distinctions in the settlers of various regions of the United States; migration is
used in Elazar’s model to describe the proliferation and melding of political subcultures
into regions of the country as American continental westward expansion evolved.
Elazar’s classification may best be described as sociopolitical device because it aspires to
create a classification structure based on the mélange of geography, local culture, and
politics unique to each state and its history (Elazar 1966).
The primary classifications of political subculture created by Elazar include
Individualistic Political Culture, Moralistic Political Culture, and Traditionalistic Political
Culture. Individualist political culture, according to Elazar, is based primarily on
government’s role for simple utilitarian reasons; it emphasizes limited intervention by the
government or nongovernmental agencies to a bare minimum to preserve the
uninterrupted rhythm of the marketplace. None of the states I examine fall into the
wholly Individualistic model. Similarly, Elazar’s conception of individualistic political
culture is defined by motivations of some office holders to be “adequately compensated
for their efforts.” (Elazar 1966) This means that in Elazar’s conception of the
individualistic political culture, office holders understand well and may actually intend to
reap the status and financial benefits of public service; he also goes on to describe that in
this individualistic culture norms of self-service and patronage for the support of others
are mutually understood and accepted by office holders and their constituencies alike.
Moralistic political culture, Elazar’s second classification, primarily emphasizes
“the commonwealth conception as the basis for democratic government.” (Elazar 1966)
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The author describes the moralistic political culture as one motivated by the best
intentions of the human race and believes that government can promote good within
society; in this way, moralistic culture deviates significantly from individualistic political
culture for its fidelity to honesty, selfless service, and the orientation toward public
welfare by those who govern. Ultimately, the largest contrast from the individualistic
conception is the moralistic’s focus on the role government can play in intervening into
the realm of private enterprise when necessary on behalf of the public and maintenance of
the community. It seems natural that many of the states where same-sex marriage has
been approved are categorized under Elazar’s classification as partially or wholly
moralistic; these states include Vermont, Maine, Minnesota, Washington, California,
New Hampshire, and Iowa. Interestingly, the moralistic political culture is dominant and
describes two of the three states where same-sex marriage referenda have been most
common: Oregon and Maine. California, which is classified as a moralistic and
individualistic cultured state, is the other state where same-sex rights have occurred most
frequently at the ballot box.

In order to determine whether there was a demonstrable and significant distinction
in the rate of change in public support for same-sex marriage I compare and contrast
Oregon and Maine each against two other states Elazar classified under the moralistic
political culture. Michigan and Wisconsin are compared as control group states against
Oregon because the fall into the same moralistic political culture under Elazar’s
classification; Colorado and Minnesota are compared against the rate of opinion change
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in Maine. All of these states are categorized under Elazar’s classification as states with
Moralistic political cultures. California, on the other hand, has a dominant hybrid
political culture between the moralistic and the individualistic. I test three other
Moralistic-Individualistic politically cultured states, Iowa, New Hampshire, and
Washington, against the rate of public opinion change in California.
Rather than simply calculate the average of opinion in these states over the time
period examined, I calculate the local trend for the states investigated between years in
the period between 2009 and 2013. As mentioned earlier, where multiple polls exist for
one state in the same year, I use the average of available polls for that year and indicate
whether or not it has been averaged using an asterisk in that year’s data cell. A
comprehensive index of the polling firms, samples, and dates of samples by state can be
found in the Appendix in tables 4.0-4.2.
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Chapter 4: Literature Review

Between recent court cases and state referenda raising the salience of same-sex
marriage and gay civil rights, national polls have also consistently shown more than
majority support for same-sex marriage (Pew Research, 2013; Gallup, 2013). However,
scholarly inquiry has been challenged to address the puzzle of not just how opinion has
changed, but why peoples’ attitudes have changed. Clearly state institutions have played
a role in bringing national salience to the topic of same-sex marriage; only recently has
the federal government’s role been more active in advocacy for gay rights. To
understand the contours of the research on same-sex marriage and prospective
connections between advances in gay rights and efforts to restrict them, I examined the
dominant body of research on same-sex marriage, gay rights restricted and advanced at
the state level, and public opinion in studies over the last 15 years. While I was unable to
find any research that specifically touched on the possibility that efforts to restrict gay
marriage have influenced growth in public opinion support for same-sex marriage or
other gay rights, many of the studies corroborate a change in opinion in the wake of these
efforts(Baunach, 2011; Baunach, Burgess, and Muse, 2010; Becker, 2012; Brewer, 2003;
Eagen, 2010; Schafer & Shaw, 2009; Sherkat et. al, 2009). My research also reveals that
historical attitudes on gay rights were fixed and largely unchanging, in part because no
media elite opinion had mediated or molded public opinion (Brewer, 2008;.Sherkat et. al,
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2010). To that point, only recently has scholarly analysis turned to an exploration of why
public opinion has changed on same-sex marriage beyond the normal demographic traits
that portend support for gay rights. Part of the difficulty in amassing scholarly
information on the subject for this paper was the dearth of information that sought to
explain why public opinion has changed, much less changed so dramatically over the last
five years both nationally and within the states. Two clear strains of inquiry emerge on
the subject of same-sex marriage and support for gay rights within the scholarly
literature; there is an older literature that addressed the demographic groups where
support for gay rights and same-sex marriage was most emergent (Alvarez & Brehm,
2002; Bowman, & O’Keefe, 2004; Brewer, 2003;Wilcox & Wolpert, 2002; Yang, 1997).
Contemporary explanations of how and why attitudes have changed appear in literature
authored within the last five years and are more dominant plausible explanations for the
change (Becker & Scheufele, 2011; Ellison, C.G. & Ramos-Wada, A.I., 2011; Gaines, N.
& Garand, J., 2010; Sherkat, D, Powell-Williams, M., Maddox, G. & de Vries, K. 2011).
For purposes of framing the relevance of my research, I discuss the more contemporary
alternative explanations for the change in attitude on same-sex marriage within the most
recent research. To the extent that it helps explain recent trends, I also integrate some of
the older demographic research that defined earlier scholarly work on attitudes toward
gay rights and same-sex marriage.
A number of dominant themes emerged in the contemporary literature that
portend support for same-sex civil rights, including marriage. The scholarly explainations
for the quick change in public opinion, cohort succession, intracohort change, contact
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theory, and exposure to various events and media relevant toward same-sex marriage are
contextualized by a review of where these changes have been most pronounced. Surely if
we are to understand the basis for why large segments of the public have changed their
attitudes toward same-sex marriage we must understand how opinion has changed. For
example, intracohort change and contact theory attempt to explain why public opinion
has changed. What also requires discussion is a focused examination of where and how
this change has been most dramatic amongst survey respondents and if it can help to
illuminate how effective each explanation is for the quick rate of change. Similarly, if
contact theory aspires to explain the quick rate of change in public opinion by pointing to
familiarity with gays or lesbians in a familial or work context, additional attention to
certain demographic groups where contact theory seems to capture a change in attitude
can help us understand the potency of contact theory’s potential explanatory power.
The following section will build a comprehensive index of the group membership
dynamics and demographic traits that generally, throughout the literature, predict support
for same-sex marriage. If we are to understand how and why opinion about same-sex
marriage has liberalized over the past twenty five years, we can learn a lot about the
answers to these questions through an extrapolation of the specific segments of the
population whose attitudes have changed the most. Moreover, the interdependent nature
of many of the competing explanations behind the rate of change in support for same-sex
marriage may insufficiently cover the array of groups where change seems most likely to
occur. Who are they? Are these views acquired in the context of media or education?
Might they be learned from an early age? Large segments of the literature seem to focus
on a narrow range of possibilities to answer these questions. Naturally, some states have
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older and younger populations, a better or less educated populous, and have ideological
or urban centers that may make things like contact theory or intracohort change more
plausible as explanations for the shift. Those factors, too, may be at play in addition to
the role that electoral events at the state level on gay rights may play regarding attitudes
in support for gay rights.

Cohort Succession

The most prominent explanation for the swift change in public opinion on the
topic of gay marriage is cohort succession (Baunach, 2012; Sherkat et al., 2011; Treas,
2002). Cohort succession purports to explain the shift toward majority support for samesex marriage by tracing the decline of older more conservative generations of Americans,
and the rise of younger more socially liberal Americans. In other words, cohort
succession asserts that younger individuals with attitudes more flexible to same-sex
marriage rights replace older generations with more rigid conceptions of marriage and
morality; this process takes place through natural age-determined mortality patterns.
(Baunach, 2012; Sherkat et al., 2011; Treas, 2002)
Both scholarly literature and polling data illustrate the importance of age in the
prediction of support for same-sex marriage. Very serious distinctions in public opinion
exist across age are revealed. If there were a near law-like relationships amongst the
survey data and scholarly research about public opinion and same-sex marriage, Youth
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support for same-sex marriage would be a near universal truth. Thus, polls suggest that
age has a significant factor on public opinion about homosexuality. (Baunach, 2011;
Becker, 2012; Becker & Scheufele, 2011; Brewer, 2003; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison,
2006) Opinion research and scholarly review of this data confirms that young people are
generally more supportive toward same-sex rights than their older counterparts; not only
are they more supportive, but they are generally more liberal than older Americans
(Brewer, 2008).
Essential to the formation of opinions on the topic of same-sex marriage is
religion- and large distinctions in adherence, practice, and self-reported religious
affiliation exist across generational cohorts (Sherkat et. al, 2009). Because of the unique
nature of America’s religious identity, both historically, and comparatively, Americans
tend to incorporate their religious values into their opinions and election preferences on a
panoply of political and social issues. Not least of these, according to Sherket et. al, are
issues like abortion, gender equality, and sexuality. To understand how religion
influences public opinion, one must understand the unique nature religion plays in
American life and culture.
Within the variety of scholarly literature on the topic of same-sex marriage a
plethora of information exists on how religion impacts attitudes toward homosexuality
and same-sex civil rights. At the heart of this data emerges two separate but equally
important strands that structure the potential opposition to same-sex marriage, based
largely on moral assessments from sacred texts. The first suggests that an individual’s
specific religious tradition is a powerful predictor of potential support or opposition to
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same-sex civil rights, especially same-sex marriage. Whether someone is mainline
protestant, Jewish, Catholic, or Baptist has been demonstrated to offer a powerful and
significant relationship between support or opposition to same-sex marriage. In this way,
membership or identification within particular religious denomination can offer potential
clues on the attitudes of an individual. The second strand of research on this demographic
illustrates the relationship between the religiosity of an individual’s faith in their life,
largely measured by survey questions about the regularity of the individual’s church
attendance and literal interpretation of sacred religious texts, can also offer a powerful
predictor of attitudes toward same-sex marriage.
Several large clear trends emerge; evangelical protestants are generally more
likely to oppose same-sex marriage than their mainline protestant or Catholic
counterparts. (Brewer, 2008) Furthermore, non-protestants are significantly more likely
to support same-sex unions than Protestants (Olson, Cadge, & Harrison, 2006).
Furthermore, non-evangelical protestants have shown a greater degree of change over
time in their attitude toward same-sex marriage than evangelical protestants, although
some change in attitude toward support was measured even amongst evangelical
protestants over the period between 1988-2006 (Baunach, 2011). Although social contact
with homosexuals will be explored in greater detail later in this study, a 2012 study
highlights that religious and ideological predispositions explain variance in support for
same-sex marriage to a greater degree than social contact (Becker, 2012). A significant
recurrent theme within the literature on attitudes toward same-sex marriage is the
influence of morality, and traditional morality associated with evangelical Protestants and
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other more socially conservative religious sects that seems to provide the foundation and
fodder for the debate about moral values over equal rights within American politics.
Since World War II, American society has become increasingly more secular, more
individualistic, and more materially focused; this shift in society has also impacted public
opinion (Becker & Scheufele, 2011). Additional social science research has codified the
tendency of those highly involved in religious life to be more conservative than secular
individuals (Olson, Cadge, & Harrison, 2006). In her 2012 article “Changing Same-Sex
Marriage Attitudes in America from 1988 through 2010,” Dawn Baunach declares that
secularism is at the core of change individual sexual attitude, one that liberalizes; she
cites research that underscores the existence of a “secularization hypothesis,”- the notion
that secularism, as measured by frequency of attendance at church services moderates
intolerance and increases support for more sexually permissive behavior. This is
measured primarily through opinion data that tracked lowering rates of disapproval
toward homosexual relations amongst those whose infrequent church attendance
classified them as secular. (Baunauch, 2012; Treas 2002) Ultimately, some of the
research surveyed briefly posits the plausibility of the diminishing role of religion in
some segments of American life and the corollary related decline in message cues
developed from churches and pastors as a possible cause of diminished opposition to
same-sex marriage. Further, attention is given to the possibility that secularism has led to
the decline in opposition to same-sex marriage because of the greater focus on
individualism, personal freedom, materialism, and education. Indeed, Americans who
described having no religious preference in the 1990s doubled from 7 to 14 percent and
cohort replacement accounted for 40% of the trend (Fischer & Hout, 2012). Astoundingly,
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when Fischer and Hout reviewed and updated the data through 2012, 60% of the trend in
decline of religious preference is attributable to cohort replacement and the tendency for
generations including and born after baby boomers to have values that undermine
traditional authority (Fischer & Hout, 2012). In essence, as older more religious
Americans pass on, the American population is increasingly unattached to a religious
preference.
Furthermore, according to Sherkat et. al, specific religious denominations play in
the formation of opinion on social issues. Their research largely points to large religious
subcultures, particularly among sectarian Protestant denominations who view
homosexuality as morally wrong and thus more negatively as revealed within public
opinion polls. Moreover, they point to areas with high densities of sectarian Christians as
more liable to reject gay civil rights and same-sex marriage. As an extension of their
body of research, they also find that specific religious beliefs help to explain variance in
public opinion on the topic of same-sex marriage. According to their research, and a
volume of other research cited within their own work, sectarian denominations increase
selective fundamentalist interpretation of sacred texts and may reinforce prejudice or
bigotry, thus leading to heightened literal interpretation of the same texts, and ultimately
shaping militant attitudes toward the provision of civil rights for a variety of groups,
including the LGBT community (Sherkat 2009).
An interesting and significant dimension of the analysis presented in the context
of their review is the important consideration of the dearth of public awareness
surrounding this issue of same-sex marriage as of 1988, when their analysis first begins
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to track attitudes toward same-sex marriage in the GSS. It would not be until the early
1990s when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in Baehr v. Miike that denials of same-sex
marriage licenses constituted a violation of the constitutional provision of equal
protection. It was also during the same time period when the Republican party
incorporated opposition to same-sex marriage as a platform item. Furthermore, not until
the election of 2004 would the issue of same-sex marriage occupy so much attention on
the national stage; the authors note that 11 states voted on the definition of marriage in
November of 2004. In advance of the 2004 election, President George W. Bush gave his
endorsement of the initiative to constitutionally define marriage as between one man and
one woman, thus lending the effort presidential prestige and greater attention. The
authors frame these events as important to the contour of the debate about same-sex
marriage as a cross roads of religious factors that mediate factors of political
conservatism on the same-sex marriage debate. Furthermore, they propose three
expectations as hypotheses that govern political mobilization targeted toward the
provision of civil rights for LGBT individuals: republicans are less supportive of
marriage rights for same-sex couples, conservative ideology will negatively impact
support for same-sex marriage, and the impact of sectarian association, religious
participation, and fundamental beliefs work through identification as a Republican and
through identification as politically conservative.
Most importantly, Sherkat et. al. cite generational cohorts as a significant element
in the changing nature of attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Their analysis highlights
the evolution of homosexuality as a taboo topic of discussion to a topic that receives a
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abundance of public acceptance as a lifestyle. Their analysis cites an “omnipresence of
sexual issues in varied media is both a source of social change, and a social influence on
further shifts in opinions toward sexuality. For younger generations forming opinions
about sexuality, coming to see GLBT persons in the open is likely humanizing, and
generates toleration. However, for people enmeshed in religious and political ties imbued
with homophobia, the public display of sexual variation may lead to backlash.” (Sherkat
et al, 2009.) It seems that some deeply-held beliefs, even amongst young people keep the
humanizing power of interaction or exposure from reducing intolerance. The authors also
claim that there has been an opinion backlash based in reaction to the extremist anti-gay
social movements like Anita Bryant’s Save Our Children, the fallout from scandals
having to do with politicians, like Idaho’s Larry Craig, and disgraced evangelical minister
Ted Haggard’s use of male prostitutes. Moreover, the culmination of issues like these,
and moderating influence amongst younger voters on cumulative public opinion result in
another series of hypotheses they present: 1) younger generational cohorts support samesex marriage and liberalize from 1988-2008; 2) there will be smaller change on attitudes
toward same-sex marriage amongst sectarian Protestants and religious fundamentalists
between 1988-2008; 3) gaps between sectarian Protestants and intra-cohort peers will be
smaller in later cohorts; 4) changes in support for same-sex marriage will be less
amongst Republicans between 1988-2008; 5) differences between republicans and
persons with alternative political identifications will decline in more recent younger
cohorts.
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The results of Sherkat et. al’s statistical analysis of GSS survey data in 1988,
2004, and 2008 give rise to some interesting but relatively uncontroversial results. For
instance, approval for same sex marriage has increased dramatically since 1988, where
initially support for same-sex marriage stood at 11% and had risen to 39% by 2008.
Analysis also confirmed significant distinctions in support for same-sex marriage
between denominations. Their first two hypotheses confirmed that opposition to samesex marriage was greater amongst those who described themselves as sectarian
Protestants than the average GSS respondent. Additionally, opposition was more uniform
amongst religious sectarians; the gap between sectarian Protestants and the average
respondent grew between 1988-2008. Interestingly, in 1988, individuals who identified
themselves as Republicans were not significantly different from Democrats or
Independents in attitude toward same-sex marriage. However, by 2008, Republican
sentiment showed a less dramatic change in public opinion in comparison to Democrats
and Independents over time since 1988. Moreover, Republican support for same-sex
marriage was significantly below other GSS respondents in 2008. The Sherkat
hypotheses regarding cohort differences showed insignificant distinctions in the results of
the 1988 survey, in contrast to their initial hypothesis. Their results only began to show
significant distinctions in cohort opinions for those born between 1956-1964 beginning as
a significant “forerunner” generation when compared against those who were born before
1940. Although, cohort effects for all but the forerunner generational cohort mentioned
earlier, and the 1940-1950 cohort, were significantly more positive in 2006-2008.
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Perhaps most interesting of all of the results discussed was the divergence of
attitudes toward same-sex marriage after the issue became more politically salient and
addressed by both of the major political parties. Also interesting was the distinction about
the evolution of attitudes between mainline Protestants and sectarian protestants, who did
not differ significantly in 1988 in their attitudes toward same-sex marriage. However,
between 2006-2008, sectarian Protestants were much less likely to support same-sex
marriage than their mainstream Protestant peers in the same time period. As expected,
their hypotheses were confirmed when their analysis corroborated that Church attendance
and biblical fundamentalism both had a significant negative effect on support for samesex marriage, even when other measures of religious and political conservatism were
taken into account. Additionally, even though 1988 demonstrated no significant
difference between respondents attitudes toward same-sex and political party
identification, by 2006-2008 Republican identification lowered the estimated odds of
responding in a more favorable category on same-sex marriage by 12%; party
identification became a significant predictor of views on same-sex marriage in the 20062008 data. Furthermore, political conservatism was found to have a strong negative
impact on support for same-sex marriage in all of the years surveyed. Similarly, selfratings of liberal-conservative became significant predictors of support for same-sex
marriage between 1988 and 2006-2008. Other demographic groups like women showed
more support for same-sex marriage than men. Education also has a strong positive effect
on support for same-sex marriage in both 1988 and 2006-2008. Furthermore, in the 20062008 data, rural and Southern natives were significantly less supportive of same-sex
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marriage, although distinctions between respondents did not significantly differ in the
1988 data.
Even though generally younger cohorts tend to be more supportive of same-sex
marriage than older cohorts, the analysis demonstrates that younger cohorts of
Republicans are substantially less supportive of same-sex marriage when compared to
intra-cohort peers. The damning influence of religious orientation and political preference
is dramatically documented in this line from their discussion:
The similarity of religious and political effects by generation is remarkable. It
appears that both religious affiliation and political identifications retard the
development of tolerant orientations, even in younger cohorts which should have
been affected by the dramatic changes in how sexuality was viewed during this
period. Both religious and political factors appear to be important for the
construction of oppositional generation units within cohorts. (Sherkat et. al. 2009
176)

What was once an obscure issue, where many Americans had little or no familiarity, has
become a commonplace topic addressed in news, media, politics, and dinner table
discussions (Sherkat et. al). Their research closes in one poignant and memorable line:
“Our research shows that opposition to same-sex marriage is increasingly anchored
among members of sectarian religious denominations, fundamentalist Christians,
Republicans, and political conservatives,” (Sherkat et. al 2009). The analysis also
suggests that successive generational cohorts were progressively more liberal in their
support for same-sex marriage born after 1945, with exception to those segments who
were sectarian Protestants or Republicans. They go so far as to suggest that cohort
replacement will play a strong role in overall value change and that “in just over a decade
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the majority of Americans will support the legalization of same-sex marriage,” (Sherkat
et. al, 2009). It has taken less than half that time for public opinion to reach above
majority levels in support of same-sex marriage. An interesting corroboration of the
Sherkat analysis is available in Pew’s recent work on tracking attitudes toward same-sex
marriage by generational cohorts, see Figure 1 in the Appendix for an interesting graphic
that represents the disparities in attitude by generation. Moreover, they also conclude by
suggesting that the public policy debate would be better informed by acknowledging the
religious and political communities where opposition and support can be found for samesex marriage.
Somewhat problematically, however, is that the rate of change in public opinion
in support for same-sex marriage has occurred at a rate more quickly than that which
cohort succession alone would predict. Cohort succession alone cannot explain why the
rate of change for support for same-sex marriage has been so quick because mortality
rates, birth rates, and the overall replacement rates in the United States have slowed to
less than replacement in recent years and remained relatively unchanged for much of the
last ten years, according to the Centers for Disease Control (Hoyert, 2012). The Politics
of Same-Sex Marriage dedicates a chapter toward exploration of public opinion and the
reality of what cohort succession alone would mean on poll data: “...generational
replacement is a very gradual process. Over time, it may well be that more citizens will
discover that they know gay men and lesbians, though the most homophobic citizens may
never have an associate come out to them. And over time, more Americans may come to
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believe in the existence of a ‘gay gene,’ though the results of future scientific research are
always uncertain (Rimmerman & Wilcox, 2007 238).
The phenomenon of increased support in public opinion as it relates to same-sex
marriage is unique and has only developed over the last two decades. (Becker, 2011)
This relationship between more conservative views toward same-sex marriage and older
generations is demonstrated in a recent Pew Research report released in 2013.
Generational groups were broken down between four different categories: the Silent
Generation, those born between 1928-1948; the Baby Boom generation, those born
between 1946-1964; the Gen X generation, those born between 1965 and 1980; and
finally, the Millennial generation, those born after 1980. Between 2003 and 2012, the
Pew report tracked changes amongst the generational cohorts that are listed above. The
Millenial cohort demonstrated the greatest shift in support for same-sex marriage over the
ten year period, a 19 percentage point increase from the average 51% reported for
Millennials in 2003. The report also cites that where Millenials only occupied 9% of the
adult U.S. population in 2003, they now occupy 27% of the adult population in 2013(Pew
Research, 2013).
While cohort succession offers a compelling narrative driven by the age and
demographic changes in the U.S. population, it only describes how attitudes have
changed and are changing based on age and association with specific generational cohorts.
Undoubtedly generational replacement will play a huge role in progressively eroding the
opposition that is embedded in older generation as they expire and are replaced by more
tolerant younger generations. The average life expectancy for those born in the Silent
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Generation is 65.88 (Arias, 2012). This means that we have reached, or in many cases,
exceeded the anticipated average life expectancy for many of those in the Silent
Generation, suggesting that because people live longer and stretch beyond their cohort’s
anticipated life expectancy, the uptick in support for same-sex marriage cannot be simply
attributed to the expiration of an entire older and less supportive generation of Americans.
Furthermore, the Baby Boomer Generation has an anticipated average life expectancy of
68.8 years for both sexes and will not begin to phase out completely based on anticipated
life expectancy and be replaced by Generation X until 2033, at the very earliest. Cohort
Succession effectively explains part of the story of how public opinion has changed
because of the rise of younger generally more tolerant, less religiously observant, and
supportive generational cohorts, but it still does not explain why younger generations
tend to be more supportive toward same-sex marriage in comparison to older generations.
Relevant to this reflection on cohort succession, efforts to restrict gay
marriage were not exclusively the province of reliably conservative or Republican states.
States like Wisconsin, Ohio, Oregon, Colorado, Michigan, and California all passed
constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage. Demographic factors attributable to age,
in some cases, may have been responsible for many of these states enacting these
restrictions. Could the key to why, in some cases, a few of these states reversed course on
their opposition be attributable to cohort succession and the expiration of older, less
tolerant, and more religious segments of the population? If so, efforts to restrict gay
marriage in states where there is a higher than average concentration of older and
younger voters could portend a flip on the issue of same-sex marriage and help explain
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why in the wake of these restrictions issue frames and narratives on justice, fairness, and
equality have taken hold of a segment of the population less interested in authority and
controlling religious predispositions and biases.

Contact Theory

One measure of the increased visibility of homosexuals in the United States was
documented by a Gallup report released in May of 2011 that revealed that adults, on
average, estimate that approximately 25% of the population is gay or lesbian (Gallup,
2011). In reality, a 2013 Gallup poll demonstrates that only 3.5% of the nation selfidentify as gay or lesbian (Gallup, 2013). The disparity between perception and reality is
a testament to the increased visibility of gays and lesbians not just in popular culture and
news events, but in our day-to-day lives. This phenomena is not unique in the world of
U.S. opinion poll demographic estimation; Americans have historically overestimated the
size of the African American and Hispanic population, too. A 2001 Gallup poll
illustrated that Americans estimated the African American population at 33%, when, in
reality, at the same period it was only 12.3% of the U.S. population. The same poll found
that Americans estimated the U.S. Hispanic population at 29%, where as in 2001 the
population in the U.S. was 12.5% (Gallup, 2001). Similarly, a CBS March 2013 poll
revealed that 61% of respondents report having a gay or lesbian colleague, close friend,
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or relative. The same question was posed in the 2003 poll and only 44% of respondents
then indicated that they knew someone in any of the same capacities, a 17 percentage
point increase over a ten year period (CBS News, 2013). These figures underscore
changes that lead some researchers and pollsters to point toward contact theory as another
popular explanation identified in more recent scholarly literature on the topic of public
opinion and increasing support for same-sex marriage. Contact theory is built upon the
notion that regular interaction with gay or lesbian individuals within one’s social network
has a liberalizing impact on the level of political tolerance and support for homosexual
civil rights policies and issues like same-sex marriage. (Becker & Scheufele, 2011;
Brewer, 2008) The framework of contact theory comes from the field of social
psychology and posits that personal contact with individuals or members of specific outgroups can reduce levels of discrimination and prejudice. (Becker & Scheufele, 2011;
Allport, 1954) Largely left out of the discussion on contact theory is the elusive nature of
human sexuality and how the entire premise is structured upon contact with openly gay or
lesbian individuals. Obviously, people have contact with lesbians and gays where
sexuality is an unknown, undisclosed, or unimportant dimension of contact; the entire
premise of contact theory’s impact, liberalizing attitudes towards homosexuals and samesex marriage, is dependent upon a subject’s awareness of an individual’s sexuality and
the openness of the homosexual in communication about their orientation.
The geographic region of the United States where someone lives is a significant
predictor of their attitudes toward same-sex civil rights, including their support for samesex marriage. Amongst the data and analysis reviewed, whether individuals lived in
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urban, suburban, or rural settings helped to predict the given likelihood of support or
opposition to same-sex marriage. Similarly, whether individuals lived in the South or
Northern United States also plays a role in the likelihood of predicting support for samesex marriage. More recent opinion research has even broken down attitude of respondents
between the Northeastern, Southwestern, Western, and Southern regions of U.S.
Research shows that rural residents and Southern natives are significantly less likely to
support same-sex marriage than those of people who live in the Northern United States
and/or lived in urban areas. (Baunach, 2011; Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, & de
Vries, 2011) Research has also confirmed that the relationship between living in a rural
areal and increased opposition to same-sex marriage. This trend seems to transcend racial
boundaries and exists among rural latinos specifically, as it does for the general opinion
data that is not correlated by race (Ellison, Acevedo, & Ramos-Wada, 2011). Location
also seems to play a role in how much a person may have exposure or familiarity with
homosexuals. A 2007 Pew Research study demonstrated that individuals in the south
were less likely to know someone who was gay than were people in the Northeast or
West. Those who reside in rural areas are also less likely to know gay people than their
urban or suburban counterparts (Pew Research, 2007, 2013).
Opinion data released from both Pew and Gallup affirms the relationship
described in some of the scholarly literature. In a 2012 report issued by Gallup Inc., the
only region of the country to register support for same-sex marriage under 50% was the
South, at 40%; those who resided in the East supported same-sex marriage by 56%, those
in the Midwest by 53%, and those in the West by 55%. The 2012-2013 Pew Research
51

poll revealed a similar cleavage in opinion between geographic regions. Amongst the
regions, only the South and the Midwest were below 50% of support in favor of same-sex
marriage, with 39 and 48 percentage points in support of same-sex marriage by each
region respectively. The Northeast registered support for same-sex marriage at 58%, the
West at 53%.
In her 2012 article “Determinants of Public Support for Same-Sex Marriage:
Generational Cohorts, Social Contact, and Shifting Attitudes”, Amy Becker points to
several interdependent relatively new elements as significant predictors of support for
gay rights: age, generational change, and social contact. Becker’s analysis examines the
prospective relationship between opinions of those who know and are familiar with
homosexuals and those who are not, and then distills the distinctions in support for gay
marriage amongst the two demographic constituencies of age and generational cohort
membership. Becker conducts quantitative analysis to examine how the degree of
personal contact with homosexuals impacts support for gay marriage. She cites age and
more youthful generational opinions toward marriage- particularly views that see
marriage as increasingly obsolete and the parallel rejection of past normative gender roles
within it, where males are primary providers- as one source of the change in public
opinion . Like other scholars, she cites a host of academic work that points to
generational replacement as a factor in the gradual liberalization of public opinion on gay
marriage. Another prospective element she introduces in the context of her analysis is
the nature of the way younger cohorts perceive the meaning and importance of marriage,
particularly as attitudes liberalize about it within younger cohorts; younger cohorts tend
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to see marriage as obsolete in comparison to older generations according to Becker. She
also insists that her analysis is somewhat distinct from other analysis on the determinants
of gay marriage since it “attempts to bridge this gap and offer a more complete picture of
the changing dynamics of public opinion toward gay civil rights issues in the United
States by concurrently considering the role of social contact, attitudes toward same-sex
parent families, and generational affiliation as predictors influencing public support for
same-sex marriage.” (Becker 2012)
Becker uses opinion data from Pew Research Center’s January 2010 Millennial
Survey to explore her synthesis of social contact, attitudes, and generational factors as
significant predictors of support for same-sex marriage. Her data suggests that social
contact with homosexuals differed significantly across generations; it also reveals an
inverse relationship between age and having a close family member or friend who is gay.
Similarly, the attitudes toward same-sex parent families varied across generations, with
attitudes inversely related to age. Additionally, support for same sex marriage also varied
across generations according to Becker’s analysis. Again, attitudes toward same sex
marriage were supported inversely when related to age, with millennials most supportive
and members of the silent generation least supportive.
Becker posits that the traditional demographic variables that generally lend
themselves toward explanation of support for same-sex marriage pale in comparison
toward the predictive power of being a millennial or a member of generation X. She
indicates that traditional variables like gender and education only explain a small amount
of variance when compared to the positive predictive power of cohort membership in the
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aforementioned generations. Other variables lend more predictive properties toward
support for same-sex marriage according to Becker. Like much of the other literature,
political and religious dispositions remain significant predictors in Becker’s analysis.
Most interestingly, support for same-sex parent families and social contact remained
significant predictors of support for same-sex marriage even when Becker controlled for
traditional demographic, political, and religious variables. In other words, Becker’s
research confirms what intuition may have suggested: age and generational membership
are related to support for same-sex marriage, and that younger generations, like
millennials, who are the most likely to support same-sex parent families, support for
same-sex marriage, and have the highest degree of social contact with gays and lesbians.
However, the social contact dimension and its impact on prediction of support for samesex marriage is not exclusive to generational cohort membership. Becker’s model
suggests that the power of social contact with gay and lesbians on support for same-sex
marriage may transcend the traditional predictive demographics of religious and value
predispositions despite their demonstrable enduring strength in her own study. (Becker
2012) Becker’s quantitative analysis confirms the influence of age and social contact on
support for same-sex marriage, where other scholarship as previously articulated has
posited that changes in public opinion may be attributable to cohort succession, where
one generation is succeeded by a more liberal and supportive attitude toward same-sex
marriage. Becker’s study is useful since it highlights the steady influence of religion and
personal ideology on public opinion, but introduces the moderating influence of age and
social contact on public opinion, even on those who may be more religiously or
ideologically opposed to same-sex marriage.
54

Gaines and Garand uncover similar results in their 2009 article “Morality,
Equality, or Locality: Analyzing the Determinants of Support for Same-Sex Marriage”.
As their article makes clear, there exist a variety of essential demographic predictors for
support of same-sex marriage; the authors point toward liberals, women, the highly
educated, urban dwellers, and whites as generally more supportive of same-sex marriage.
However, their article aspires to trace individual attitudes toward same-sex marriage
along a variety of independent variable clusters. They use 2004 American National
Election Studies (ANES) data to examine a variety of conventional variables on support
for same-sex marriage; the conventional variables they test include moral and religious
attitudes and traditions, attitudes towards gay and lesbians, gender roles and women’s
rights, support for minority civil rights, symbolic politics, general demographic attributes,
and county-level context. They also merge the ANES data with data from the U.S.
Census to explore the possible relationship between same-sex partnered households and
the context of those living in that context and levels of support for same-sex marriage. In
other words, they sought to determine whether or not living near or around same-sex
couples impacted support for same-sex marriage. Conversely, it could also be argued that
gays, like other groups, tend to self-select places to live where their relationship and
orientation would be welcome and unquestioned. However, the Gaines and Garand piece
fits nicely into the notion that contact with gays and lesbians may increase support for
gay rights.
The most interesting variables tested in the 2009 article include the relationships
between gender roles and women’s rights, support for Black Civil Rights, contact and
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context near or around gays and lesbians, and symbolic politics. The aforementioned
measures incorporated into the Gaines and Garand article are determined in the following
ways: using a feeling thermometer scale for feminists, level of agreement that women
demanding equality seek special favors, level of agreement that women miss good jobs
because of discrimination, and level of agreement that women’s complaining about
harassment causes problems. They also used a 7-point scale to measure respondent’s
beliefs about what the current role of women should be in society where attitudes that
expressed support for women playing more traditional roles scored a 0, to 6 indicating
that women should have equal roles. Support for black civil rights was also explored in
the context of support for same-sex marriage, individuals were asked questions
concerning their sympathies for expanded opportunities and rights for blacks including
support for government assistance to blacks, support for government imposed policies
directed toward fair employment for blacks, support for a statement that history has made
it more difficult for blacks to succeed, agreement with an assertion that blacks have less
than they deserve, and support for preferential hiring for blacks.
The last two variables they included in their study as potentially indicative of
support for same-sex marriage were contact and context with gays and lesbians as well as
symbolic politics, the process of being socialized to support a policy or idea even though
it may not be in one’s own self –interest to do so. The context variable was measured by
merging data obtained from the U.S. Census, the Gay and Lesbian Atlas, and the ANES
data set. Symbolic politics, as broadly described above, were measured by a 7-point
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scale ranging from 0, strong Democrat, to 6, strong Republican; an index of ideology was
also used in this category with 0 indicative of a strong liberal and 6 as strong conservative.
The results of their 2009 study corroborate a wealth of knowledge about public
opinion and gay marriage that has been highlighted within other literature: morality and
religion play a controlling and overriding influence on public opinion concerning not just
gay rights but attitudes toward gays and lesbians more generally, one that potentially
retards the influence of youth, contact, or media exposure. Additionally, the link between
conservative ideology and opposition to same-sex marriage is one of the most powerful
predictors amongst the literature surveyed herein. Overall, conservative political ideology
and self-described political association with the Republican party is a significant
predictive trait for opposition to same-sex marriage; much like advanced age, support for
the Republican party, and even in some cases, religion. Social science and public opinion
research has demonstrated that self-described political conservatives oppose same-sex
marriage more uniformly than other demographic groups (Becker A.B, “Determinants of
public support for same-sex marriage”; Brewer, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2006, 2013).
However, their analysis did not establish a significant relationship between
attitudes towards civil rights for African Americans and attitudes toward women’s rights:
“One of our most interesting findings relates to the null effect of attitudes toward civil
rights for black Americans on attitudes toward same-sex marriage. If civil rights for
blacks and gays are linked in the minds of the mass public, one would expect support for
black civil rights to be a strong predictor of support for same-sex marriage. Based on our
results...it is difficult to find much support for this hypothesis” (Gaines and Garand,
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2009). Their analysis also revealed distinctions in the type of opinions that conditioned
support for same-sex marriage based on gender roles: those who support equal gender
roles are related to support for same-sex marriage, but support for women’s rights did not
have a discernible effect on support for same-sex marriage.
Like previous research, their data did support a relationship between
ideology and support for same-sex marriage, but not a strong relationship when
controlled for other variables. Identification as a Republican in this analysis did not have
a discernible effect on respondents’ support for same-sex marriage. On the other hand,
their analysis did reinforce existent academic data that shows women as more supportive
toward gays and lesbians than men. Gender plays a major role in the evolving debate
about same-sex rights. Whether the distinction exists on purely self-identified political
party allegiance, or on measures of a compassion index, women, cumulatively, view the
world around them differently than men (Wilcox, 2008). Women have more persistently
supported the Democratic party’s nominee in every presidential election since 1980
(Wilcox, 2008). Women, according to survey data, also have more liberal views on
policy issues like healthcare, education, and child care (Alvarez and McCaffery, 2003).
According to a panoply of social science opinion research, women are also much more
likely to support gay marriage (Becker & Scheufele, 2011; Neldorf and Morin, 2007;
Rimmerman & Wilcox, 2007).
Some attention has been given to the prospective reasons for the distinction
between male and female opinion and the variation in attitude toward homosexuals,
homosexual relations, and same-sex civil rights, like marriage. Initial explorations of the
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topic in the 1990s posited the potential inflexibility of male perceived gender roles as a
reason for more negative attitudes toward homosexuality and same-sex civil rights (Kite
and Whitley, 1996). While the gap on attitudes toward same-sex marriage is not wide
between the genders, it is relatively consistent over time; Pew Research produced an
interesting graphic that contextualizes the gender gap between support for same-sex
marriage between 2001-2012. I have included the graphic as Figure 2 within the
Appendix.

Worth consideration in future studies is whether or not the turnout in statewide
elections where gay rights are on the ballot deviate significantly from other elections and
normal rates of female participation. Furthermore, perhaps the states with the most
electoral activity on gay rights have an entirely unique imbalance of gender participation
in special elections over time that have allowed California, Oregon, and Maine to
encounter questions about gay rights at the ballot so frequently.
Female voters, since 1964, have exceeded their males counterparts in voting in
presidential elections (Center for American Women and Politics, 2011; Washington Post,
2013) and women are generally more supportive of same-sex marriage than men. Since
the United States Supreme Court resisted any hugely groundbreaking decisions in the
June 2013 Hollingsworth and Windsor cases, decisions which tested the framework of
state’s rights over gay rights and the constitutionality of prohibitions on same-sex
marriage at the federal level, proponents are well-advised to tailor their efforts to the
female electoral powerhouse.
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Proponents of contact theory also claim that physical living context does not have
a significant effect on support for same-sex marriage; the data presented by Gaines and
Garand suggests, at least for the snapshot of the 2004 presidential election, suggests that
those individuals who lived in communities with a large density of same-sex partnered
households were no more likely to support same-sex marriage. However, some of their
empirical evidence suggests that a small subset of individuals who live in counties with
above average populations of same-sex households there was a strong interaction effect
for attitudes toward gay and lesbians and those whose home was in counties with higher
percentage of same-sex partnered households. This gives some credibility to the notion
of contact theory, that individuals who live and commonly interact with a minority, will
demonstrate a greater propensity toward tolerance and thus become more supportive of
policies supporting that minority group. All in all, the data presented in the Gaines and
Garand analysis does not significantly deviate from previous work done on the topic of
public opinion and the topic of same-sex marriage. The authors remind readers that the
public does not seem to see the quest for same-sex civil rights as similar to those for civil
rights, nor is there a relationship between higher than average presence of same-sex
partnered households and support for same-sex marriage. In the end, according to Gaines
and Garand, morality, rather than constructivist notions of equality, or geographic
location, seems to be the strongest predictor of opinion toward same-sex marriage.
Furthermore, additional social science research has found evidence to support that
“personal contact with members of ‘least-liked groups’ can have a positive impact on
traditional measures of political tolerance, or the ‘willingness to put up with those things
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one rejects or opposes.”(Becker & Scheufele, 2011- 328) Paul Brewer’s Value War
expounded on the potential power of contact theory and established a relationship
between greater increased contact with gay men and lesbians and an increase attitude and
opinion. In total, the quantitative analysis of the aforementioned scholars is
overwhelmingly supportive of the concept of contact theory as an important ingredient in
increasing support for same-sex marriage. Scholarly analysis has also been corroborated
by very recent public opinion data that confirms that contact with gays and lesbians is the
top self-identified reasons amongst those whose minds have changed on the topic of
same-sex marriage (Pew Research, 2013). What is not as clear is the varying degrees of
ideological orientation and whether or not they hold up in the face of a public more and
more normalized toward contact with homosexuals. However, human sexuality does not
solely exist in a binary state, where people are exclusively heterosexual or homosexual;
sexuality is also a matter of perception, where people may or may not know about the
sexuality of their friends, family, or co-workers. Thus, describing contact with gays and
lesbians as an influencing factor on changed attitudes may be a heuristic means of
describing a reduction in prejudice. It seems likely that the actual number of people who
are gay and lesbian have not changed as a percentage of the population, meaning that the
increasing public acknowledgement of homosexuality within peer, family, and work
groups is an important psychological and sociological development that has ushered in
greater tolerance. In reality, there have always been homosexuals and bisexuals- and
people have always had contact with them, regardless of whether or not they were aware
of their self-identified sexuality. In the final analysis, contact with homosexuals emerges
as the strongest attribute self-selected by poll respondents when asked why their opinion
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has shifted on the topic of same-sex marriage; academic research corroborates the
durability of this relationship and underscores the important role it has played in the
public opinion landscape on same-sex marriage and on gay rights more broadly.

Intracohort Change

Intracohort change describes demonstrable changes in individual attitude over
time across generational gaps. Essentially, intracohort change describes the simple
reflection of changed minds on the topic of gay rights, particularly same-sex marriage.
Recent research has confirmed that the largest change in attitudes toward same-sex
marriage between 1988 and 2006 occurred because of intracohort change (Baunach, 2010,
2012; Treas, 2002); this change has been documented across all age cohorts. Baunach’s
article uses the General Social Survey and survey responses collected between 1988 and
2006 to distill the changes in public opinion toward gay marriage; she notes that the GSS
first started asking questions about gay marriage in 1988, again in 2004, and again in
2006. Her data focuses primarily on the end points of the trend so as to draw contrasts
and provide the earliest “national-level probability data on the topic.” (Baunach, 2010)
This is relevant since there is a dearth of data on the topic of attitudes toward gay
marriage preceding 2003. Baunach takes note of the mirrored relationship between
attitudes towards homosexuals more generally and the evolution of attitudes toward gay
marriage. Attention is given to the evolution of public opinion toward homosexuality and
homosexual rights as it evolved through the late 20th century to where it now enjoys
supermajority levels of support in public opinion polls.
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Dawn Michelle Baunach’s 2011 article “Decomposing Trends in Attitudes
Toward Gay Marriage, 1988-2006” examines the emergent trends in support for gay
marriage based on generational changes and the impact of current events on attitude
changes. Her research is distinct in contrast to the Shaw and Scheufele article since it
focuses on demographic changes, two dynamics that Baunach refers to as intracohort
change and the cohort succession effect. Furthermore, Baunach points to the change in
message framing by gay marriage supporters and significant events as a prospective
alternative explanations for the shift in attitudes of those who used to disapprove of gay
marriage in 1988 and who had changed their opinions by 2006.
The strength of Baunach’s analysis about attitude trends toward same-sex
marriage is where she focuses on why attitudes have changed. Her analysis posits that
modified message “framing” in advocacy of gay marriage as an equality issue has
changed over time to become more effective and thus changed the minds and attitudes of
certain individuals as reflected in public opinion polls. In particular, she contends that
this constructivist explanation of the potential source of the change in public opinion is
importance since individuals are not merely consumers of media messages and frames,
but communicate them and actively engage in discourse that, in the aggregate, changes
attitudes in public opinion on the topic vis-a-vis opinion poll data. The other potential
cause of change in attitudes toward gay marriage, she contends, could be traced to current
events and issues involving the gay rights movement that underscore the importance of
the equality message frame: “...the 1998 murder of Matthew Shepard, the gay rights
movement, various entertainments (Ellen, Will and Grace, Queer Eye for the Straight
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Guy, Brokeback Mountain, etc.) the decoupling of HIV/AIDS and homosexuality, that
fewer people think that homosexuality is a “choice,” and the “outings” of celebrities and
other gay men and lesbians are used in or employed an equality/tolerance framing and
could have had a more liberalizing effect on opinion over time” (Baunach, 2010). This
aspect of her analysis is diluted because it is unsubstantiated beyond mere speculation.
The second aspect of Baunach’s article analyzes the attitude trend concerning gay
marriage; here she introduces the general processes that distinguishes the framework of
attitude trend analysis: population changes or individuals’ shifting views on a topic. Here
she cites two different processes at play in trend analysis, the first related to population
shifts that occur at a societal-level. These societal level changes are explained by
generational replacement, where one successive “birth cohort” replaces an older cohort,
which I have discussed earlier. Because attitudes shift to reflect the sentiments of the later
cohort, there is slow change since replacement must take place naturally. Baunach
contends that successive cohort changes in attitude are a natural process over time. For
example, if we examine the long-term ideological changes in the wake of World-War II,
she claims that concepts like individualism, secularization, and materialism are driven by
modernity and thus evolve as successive birth cohorts replace older cohorts with new
ideologies. The other process at play she describes as intracohort change: the process
describes how as individuals go through their lives and are exposed to new ideas, people,
and events, these interactions may have the propensity to impact their opinions. Baunach
claims that this is the other element of trend analysis that may explain the attitudinal
shifts in public opinion polls on gay marriage.
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Baunach brings the various aspects of her analysis together to answer two
important questions in the quest to better understand shifting attitudes toward gay
marriage: a) why have attitudes changed over time toward gay marriage?; b) How have
attitudes toward gay marriage changed over time? Baunach answers by establishing a
relationship between new innovations in message frames and societal events that
underscore them to answer the “why” question. She answers the how question more
convincingly with her analysis on the change in public opinion as attributable to cohort
succession and intracohort change. Most importantly, her analysis revealed that
intracohort change was responsible for the majority of the change in attitudes toward gay
marriage. This data point suggests that attitude changes are more attributable to changed
minds toward the topic of gay marriage than to the replacement of older generations by
younger more tolerant generations.
Baunach’s recent work has suggested that part of the reason for the persistence of
large changes within and across cohorts over time has to do with the new message frames
and shifts in cultural values that individuals are exposed to over time. Baunach posits a
useful way of thinking about the forces that have impacted how attitudes have changed
toward same-sex marriage, and the separate, perhaps more important question, about why
they have changed; cultural shifts and new message frames from the media and elites
provide the genesis for why attitudes have changed, while concepts like cohort
succession and intracohort change are the vehicles for how they have changed and been
measured in public opinion. Intracohort change is conceptually important to this analysis
because it fills the very large gap in assumptions about cohort replacement. Attempting to
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explain the change in attitude toward same-sex marriage only through the scope of
generational replacement is instinctively and analytically inadequate because public
opinion is not static and often malleable.
In their 2009 article “The Polls- Trends Tolerance in the United States,” Chelsea
Schafer and Greg Shaw trace the contours of public opinion on a host of groups in the
United States that have typically been held with little regard in polls. Schafer and Shaw
examine survey data to examine trends amongst these typically unpopular groups and
their rights to act and advocate their lifestyle or perspectives. Among the groups
highlighted by Shaw and Schafer are homosexuals and the evolution in public attitude
toward them over the last decade. Amongst their findings, Shaw and Schafer note that
attitudes toward homosexuals in general have been moving in their favor more quickly
than amongst other groups noting, “Gay and lesbian people perhaps have enjoyed the
largest shift in public opinion during the past decade and a half, particularly in the realm
of civil rights.” Shafer and Shaw note that the increase in support for homosexuals may
mean that the intolerance that they faced may have shifted to other outgroups, like
Muslims. Of particular importance to their study is that there is a broad pattern of
growing acceptance for people whose lifestyles, beliefs, and ethnicity are not like their
own.
Other processes within society could also help to explain the dynamic of changed
minds on the topic of same-sex marriage or gay rights more generally. The changing
scope of education in the United States may also play a role in forming attitudes towards
gay rights. There exists a significant amount of scholarly literature on the disparities
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between the attitudes of the educated and less educated in American politics. Educational
attainment is generally related to more progressive or liberal attitudes in matters of social
and political equality (Brewer, 2008). Over and over again opinion research data has
corroborated the relationship between educational attainment and public opinion on a
panoply of social issues. As related to support for same-sex marriage, however,
educational disparities explain some variance in public attitudes toward the provision of
civil marriage equality but not the same strength demonstrated in other demographic or
identity attributes. Pew Research released a poll in October of 2009 that found a narrow
plurality of voters with a college degree supported same-sex marriage; 49% of those
surveyed with a college degree indicated support, while 43% of the same group opposed
the policy. Interestingly, the same relationship between education and attitude emerged in
survey questions about civil unions and the morality of homosexuality. The same poll
revealed a whopping 70% of those with a college degree in favor of civil unions for
same-sex couples; amongst those who had only some college, the percentage remained
well-above majority level at 62%. Only amongst those who had a high school diploma or
less did support for civil unions dip below majority level at 47%. Similar opinion
cleavages existed when respondents were asked about the morality of homosexual
behavior (Pew Research, 2009).
Similar results have been highlighted by scholars via election survey analysis
from the National Election Studies 2004 survey. Additional research suggests that the
impact of change in attitudes toward same-sex marriage has been more pronounced
amongst those with more education than less, meaning that those with more education
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than less are more likely to demonstrate a shift in opinion on the topic (Baunach, 2011).
The impact of education on attitudes toward same-sex marriage does not seem to be
limited to those in younger generations. In fact, a 2011 study found that higher levels of
education were positively linked to support for gay marriage across all generations
(Becker & Scheufele, 2011). The relationship between education and support for samesex marriage appears to be one of the more durable demographic predictors on the topic.
Evidence its durability exists in the most recent 2013 Pew Research Center poll that
focused on the topic of same-sex marriage (Pew Research Center, 2013).
Paul Brewer posits that the significant disparities in attitude toward same-sex
marriage exist by educational attainment because of the educational process itself, an
almost implicit nod to the concept of the transformative power of education to change
attitudes because of exposure to a new idea or series of concepts and knowledge. Brewer
contends that one possible explanation for the distinction in opinion by education comes
from the pro-gay rights and pro-equality messages that may emerge from faculty or in
college coursework. The other potential reason presented in Value War emerges from
tendency of the more educated to be attuned to the messages of “political, social, and
scientific elites.” (Brewer, 2008 31) Questions emerge for further research and
consideration on the topic of how education may mediate attitudes toward social issues,
like same-sex marriage; how has educational attainment changed in the United States and
are there studies to survey social attitudes of students before and after their education?
While education serves as one hallmark potential indicator of why individuals
have changed their mind, several other themes also become clear: certain demographic
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groups within cohorts have demonstrated a propensity for greater change over time than
others despite that, as mentioned earlier, intracohort shifts in attitude toward same-sex
marriage have changed across all generations, even amongst those who describe
themselves as conservative. Polling firms like Gallup, Pew, and independently
commissioned polls for television networks and newspapers have captured this dynamic.
Some even now place questions on the poll asking respondents if they have changed their
mind and if so, why. Across all adults in the 2013 Pew Research Center poll, 49%
indicated support for same-sex marriage. Since 2003, this change in support for allowing
gays and lesbians to marry has undergone a 16 percentage point increase; when broken
down by generation, Millennials have undergone the greatest shift in support for legal
same-sex marriage with a 19 percentage point shift from 51% in 2003. Interestingly, the
Baby Boom generation demonstrated the smallest shift amongst all generations, from
33% to 38%, while a higher percentage of those in the Silent generation and Generation
X showed a shift in their attitudes toward legal same-sex marriage, albeit smaller than the
Millennial segment (Pew Research, 2013).
Notably, differences persist in attitudes toward same-sex marriage when
examined by race; these differences are important when examining the overall change to
majority support for same-sex marriage because the racial landscape of America is
changing. States like Oregon and Maine are far from the most diverse states in the Union;
Oregon’s population stands at only 2% African American and 12.2% Hispanic or Latino
(U.S. Census, 2012) . Maine, in 2012, had only 1.3% of its population estimated as
African American and 1.4% Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census, 2012). California, on the
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other hand, had an estimated African American population of 6.6% and Hispanic/Latino
population of 38.2%. Most specifically, the differences between African American
attitudes toward same-sex civil rights and white or latino attitudes are markedly different.
(Brewer, 2008) Scholarly research and opinion data continually reinforce the dearth of
support amongst African Americans for same-sex marriage, particularly when compared
to white Americans. (Baunauch, 2011;Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, & de Vries,
2010; Sherkat, de Vries, & Creek, 2010) While African Americans tend to be liberal in
their attitudes toward a number of policy areas like affirmative action, social welfare
programs, and their opposition to capital punishment- this progressive policy streak has
not translated into support for same-sex marriage. Why is this the case?
Volumes of scholarly research and opinion data indicate that adherence to
evangelical strands of Protestantism may explain the distinction between races. (Sherkat,
de Vries, & Creek, 2010) Some of this research has gone as far to list specific religious
denominations as responsible for the disparity between the whites and blacks when it
comes to same-sex marriage:
Many activists and commentators have argued that AfricanAmerican religiosity is primarily responsible for their conservative
views about homosexuality and same-sex marriage, and a recent
analysis of Proposition 8 voting supports that conclusion (Egan and
Sherrill, 2009). The majority of African Americans hold affiliations
in Baptists and other sectarian denominations, such as the Church of
God in Christ, and African Americans have the highest rate of
religious participation of any subgroup of the U.S. population. Yet,
compared to white conservative Protestant denominations, AfricanAmerican denominations play a quite different political role, and this
may alter the relationship between religious factors and support for
same-sex marriage. (Sherkat, de Vries, & Creek, 2010)
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Furthermore, the distinctions between attitude toward same-sex marriage between whites
and blacks has only grown over time. Paul Brewer notes in Value War that while attitudes
toward policy areas like employment non-discrimination toward homosexuals in the work
environment and allowing gays to serve openly in the military were on par with white
respondents earlier in opinion research, disparities have seemed to grow over time.
(Brewer 28, 2008) He also notes that the change in public opinion on this issue reflects
some confounding puzzles that are left unanswered by research. For instance, we find
that where African Americans were as or more likely to support laws against employment
discrimination and policies allowing gays to serve openly in the military, later research
shows a reversal, with white respondents significantly more likely to support policies like
gay adoption and same-sex marriage.
In recent opinion data released in March of 2013, the relationship between
increased support amongst white respondents is affirmed. The Pew Research poll
released in March 2013 revealed a continuing gap between whites and blacks and their
attitudes toward same-sex marriage; 40% of black respondents overall favored legal
same-sex marriages, compared to 49% of white respondents (Pew Research, 2013).
While the distinction between African-Americans and whites in the United States
persists- both racial segments of the United States population have changed their attitudes
significantly over the last ten years. In 2003, only 32% of white respondents supported
legal same-sex marriage. Similarly, only 27% of blacks surveyed in 2003 supported legal
same-sex marriages; a change of 17 and 13 percentage points respectively (Pew
Research Center, 2013). While the rate of change toward support for same-sex marriage
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amongst black Americans is less than among white Americans, it remains to be seen
whether or not there will be a similar trajectory of support within racial communities as
there has been in the white population of the United States. Future public opinion trend
analysis may reveal accelerated support within racial communities- a factor that would
impact some states and regions, particularly in the South, more than others as they
confront past restrictions on same-sex marriage and other gay rights.
Obviously there are other racial dimensions to consider when examining the
sources of changing attitudes of Americans on same-sex marriage. Latino and AsianAmericans occupy a growing and important role in the changing contours of the samesex marriage debate in the United States because of the rapidly changing composition of
the U.S. population and the electoral power that will come with those demographic
changes. Largely unaddressed are examinations of Latino and Asian-American attitudes
within the research about trends in public attitudes toward same-sex marriage. This is a
particularly large omission since Latino Americans have overtaken African Americans as
the largest U.S. minority group at 16.9% of the entire population, whereas the black
population is estimated at 13.1% (U.S. Census, 2012). Only recently has attention been
given to the evolution of attitude amongst Latinos. A 2011 study cites that like African
Americans, Latino attitudes on the topic of same-sex marriage are largely the byproduct
of their religious beliefs and habits, with Latino evangelicals Protestants and sectarian
groups the most opposed to same-sex marriage. (Ellison, Acevedo, & Ramos-Wada,
2011) The same report shows that, like African Americans, Latinos have Democratic
party leanings but adhere to more conservative cultural values that their views on the
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topic of same-sex marriage. However, initial data as discussed in this and earlier sections,
suggests that an intersection of secularization, contact with homosexuals, and a
significantly younger and racially diverse composition within the United States will
change the opinion landscape. Herein lies the next great challenge for advocates of gay
rights, to identify and mobilize these constituencies of supporters who will play an
evolving and increasingly larger role in the gay rights debate as time persists.
There exist a few ways to determine who amongst survey respondents have
demonstrated the greatest propensity to change their mind and attitude about legal samesex marriage. One way to evaluate who has demonstrated this capacity to change is to ask
within the survey, which Pew did in their most recent poll. Of the 49% of respondents
who indicated support for legal same-sex marriage in the 2013, 33% indicated that they
had always held that position. However, 14% of that same group self-reported that they
had changed their mind; this means that 14% of the American population surveyed in the
2013 poll have changed their mind on the topic of same-sex marriage. Of those who
indicate support for legal same-sex marriage in 2013, 28% have changed their minds. In
contrast, amongst those who oppose same-sex marriage, 41% of the 44% indicate that
they have always been opposed to it. The same Pew poll also sought to understand why
individuals who had acknowledged a change in their attitude had shifted their opinion.
The Pew research poll asked respondents what caused them to change their mind and the
open-ended responses are illustrative of one key concept discussed earlier in this section,
contact theory. Of those who indicated their attitude had shifted 32% cited familiarity
with someone who is homosexual as a reason, 25% cited a greater open-mindedness and
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thought about it as they have aged, with other segments citing gay marriage’s
inevitability, a rapidly changing world, and freedom to choose love and happiness
without government interference.
Another way to evaluate what segments of respondents have demonstrated a
greater susceptibility to intracohort change is through examination of groups where
change in support for same-sex marriage been the most pronounced. Among selfdescribed Democrats, ideological moderates, Liberal Democrats, Democrats aged
between 50-64, Independents aged between 18-29, White mainline protestants who attend
church weekly or more, White mainline protestants above age 65, white Democrats, all
whites 65 and over, and Catholics over 65, the change has been dramatically larger in
comparison to other segments of the population, with swings in support over 20
percentage points greater than their levels measured in 2003. (Pew Research, 2013)
What becomes clear from the above reflection on intracohort change is that minds
have changed about same-sex marriage in America; whether or not they are best
measured by open-ended responses on opinion poll questions, or by measuring where the
shift in opinion toward support for same-sex marriage has been the most dramatic, it is
clear that a significant segment of the American population have reevaluated their stance
on the issue. I have found no data within any of the scholarly literature or opinion
research that indicates any segment of respondents have declined in their level of support
for same-sex marriage. Incredibly, amongst all segments the change in attitude has been
entirely positive in growth of support for same-sex marriage legality. Intracohort change
captures the simple notion that people have changed their attitudes on a topic across
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generational cohorts. Intracohort change scholarship and opinion date on the topic of
attitudes toward same-sex marriage is compelling because it corroborates the self-evident
change in attitudes over the past two decades, it isolates the generations where change
has been most pronounced, and further identifies certain demographics across all
generations that made change more likely.
So, why is intracohort change relevant to the larger puzzle presented in this paper
that efforts to restrict gay rights, in specific same-sex marriage, may have influenced a
surge in support for same-sex marriage? Intracohort change may help explain and predict
which segments of an electorate or processes (like increased contact with homosexuals,
education, media exposure) are most likely to serve as the catalyst from the original
position, restriction of rights, to support for and assisting in the provision of same-sex
marriage rights. In other words, the individuals whose minds have changed are at the
epicenter of how public opinion has changed at the individual state level and at the
national level; processes like contact theory, exposure to media cues, and educational
attainment may all help explain why individual attitudes change, not just how they have
changed amongst demographic segments. Perhaps states at the forefront of the gay rights
debate, like Oregon, California, and Maine, all have populations that are largely more
prone to “influence” and message frames because of demographic factors and processes
at play in those states which have helped to elevate and propel the salience of the national
debate about gay rights and same-sex marriage rights. Further social science research
into this area would be hugely beneficial to help understand what demographic groups
and processes can shape and change attitudes in other areas.
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Elite Cues
The scholarly basis for the foundation of elite opinion as an influence on public
opinion comes from the work of both Samuel Popkin and Anthony Downs. Popkin’s The
Reasoning Voter gives the foundational elements of how political elites influence opinion
leaders, those in a society who pay close attention to civic and cultural matters and then
subsequently help to shape and disseminate their views and perspectives on the ordinary
less attentive citizenry who adopt them. Paul Brewer also incorporates other elements of
Popkin’s research, including those that come from Economics. Specifically, Downs’
economic theory of democracy, which reduces people’s political decision making to a
series of heuristics that allow them to quickly categorize concepts, people, and cues into a
simplified political world where things may seem liberal or conservative, Republican or
Democratic. Popkin integrates Downs’ research into his own to describe his notion of
“low-information rationality” where people rely on signals and familiar message cues as
reference points from people who share their view (Brewer, 2008). Today, cues abound
in the media, through political parties, through candidates, advertising, and media elites
where the public can find heuristics on how to define and describe their own opinions on
gay rights and issues like same-sex marriage. This abundance of coverage and discussion
has given rise to the salience of gay rights as a prominent issue within contemporary
American public debate and greater influence of the cues provided by the media, political
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elites, and high profile events like the 2013 Supreme Court rulings on the Defense of
Marriage Act, California’s Proposition 8, or the provision of same-sex marriage rights in
Hawaii, New Jersey, and Illinois.

As of the writing of this paper, it seems nearly impossible that a person in the
United States could escape the attention that has been given to the topic of same-sex
marriage in the early months of 2014. Clearly, a larger degree of public debate has been
spent on the topic of gay rights and same-sex marriage over the last five years than the
preceding five years. An electorate’s information is often mediated by elite media
influences like elite opinion and high profile events that are often prone to interpretation
by media elite and mediated to the public over a variety of media mediums(Brewer,
2008). The Republican Party or MSNBC may influence a potential voter in much the
same way Oprah or Bill Maher may impact another potential voter and her election
decision-making process. Similarly, each of those parties may interpret and frame events
surrounding a high profile issue, like the firing of a high school principal at a Catholic
School because of his homosexuality, in a way that shapes their followers views and
influences their behavior. Furthermore, news stations, political elites, and celebrities
have cultivated familiar themes in the American public debate that has impacted the
saliency of gay rights and same-sex marriage. In the wake of the November 2012 ballot
victories gay rights activists in Washington, Maryland, Maine, and Minnesota have
fueled additional speculation about future electoral initiatives designed to authorize the
provision of same-sex marriage at the ballot box in other states. Similarly, two major
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Supreme Court cases were argued in March 2013 that addressed the constitutionality of
California’s Proposition 8 and Congress’ 1996 Defense of Marriage Act. This research
has benefitted significantly from increased attention given to the topic as at least nine
national polls with questions on same-sex marriage have been released this year. (Silver,
2013) Media cues, elites, and events are alternative explanations behind the swift shift in
public opinion. This explanation has more to do with why opinion has shifted than how
public opinion has shifted.
Paul Brewer’s Value War discusses the potential for elites and the increased
visibility of gays and lesbians to explain the transformation in public opinion about
homosexuality and gay civil rights policy:
One potential explanation for the transformation in public opinion about gays,
lesbians, and homosexuality lies with changes in the messages that political,
social, and scientific elites put forth in public debate. During the 1990s and
beyond, Americans received a different mix of messages about gays, lesbians, and
homosexuality than they had in previous decades. The debate about the origins of
homosexuality provides one example. A key moment this debate came in 1994,
when Science magazine published a National Institute of Health study that
endorsed a genetic explanation for homosexuality. Such a message - amplified by
media coverage- could have served to undermine public beliefs that
homosexuality was a choice (and a changeable one at that) while reinforcing
“nature” attributions for homosexuality.” (Brewer, 2008)

When we consider the trajectory of the debate about gay rights, it is useful to think about
the panoply of elite discussion on a range of issues, beginning as early as the debate
about the adoption of employment anti-discrimination policies to include homosexuals or
the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy under the Clinton administration. An interesting and
potentially instructive note about the potential validity of Brewer’s claim is to note the
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similarity in public opinion that existed before the public had been exposed to public
policy debates about homosexuals. In the late 1980s, public opinion was largely united in
its opposition to same-sex marriage (Sherkat, et al., 2009). Not until 1992 did the
Republican party platform adopt formal opposition to same-sex marriage. Interestingly,
before 1992, public opposition and hostility as documented in attitudes toward sexual
relations between two adults of the same sex were consistent; between 1973 to 1988
those who described those relations as always wrong were relatively stable (Brewer,
2003). However, beginning in 1992 hostility began to decrease as measured on the GSS
survey; those who responded to the question about the nature of same-sex relations as
always wrong began to drop from 71% in 1992 to 54% by 1998. Simultaneously, support
for gay rights policies, like service in the armed forces and protections against
employment discrimination, began to increase by double digit margins (Brewer, 2003).
Clearly, something served as a catalyst to make gay issues more salient to the public in
the period between 1988 and 1992- and it seems plausible that because elites began to
discuss and take positions on public policy related to gay rights, public opinion changed.
Elite opinion may have emerged from both sides of the political spectrum, with people
like Pat Buchanan drawing attention to issues like gay rights in his 1992 address to the
Republican National Convention as a part of a broader culture war. An excerpt of
Buchanan’s speech is illustrative: “The agenda Clinton and Clinton would impose on
America- abortion on demand, a litmus test for the Supreme Court, homosexual rights,
discrimination against religious schools, women in combat- that’s change, all right. But it
is not the kind of change America wants. It is not the kind of change America needs. And
it is not the kind of change we can tolerate in a nation that we still call God’s country.”
79

(Nagourney, 2012) On the other side of the debate were political elites like Bill Clinton,
who in his 1992 presidential campaign pledged to overturn the ban on homosexual
service in the military.
Because elites tend to mediate the public’s attitude toward current events, the
public, and the electorate more specifically, also approach high profile events that take
place and are portrayed within the media from the lens as it is portrayed by elites who
present it. As I mentioned earlier, whether a person keeps up-to-date on current events
from popular programs like “The View”, “Fox and Friends”, or PBS’ “News Hour” may
each have a dramatic unique impact on how they view and interpret the greater visibility
of issues concerning gay rights that occur in day-to-day news.

The heightened visibility of gays and lesbians in the media, along with the greater
degree of attention paid to gay rights legislation and legal cases are another variation of
what constitutes a potential explanation for the reason in dramatic shift in public opinion
about homosexuals and gay rights under the larger umbrella of elite cues(Brewer, 2008).
This visibility is almost always mediated by elites in a position to sculpt or frame events
concerning gay rights, or more specifically same-sex marriage. How an individual
processes news on the Supreme Court’s 2013 decisions may be shaped dependent on
whether she watches MSNBC or Fox News, or follows Sarah Palin or Perez Hilton on
Twitter. Paul Brewer discusses the prospect of greater visibility and its potential impact
on opinion in greater detail, particularly the proliferation of celebrities and television
shows that depicted gay characters or situations:
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A third explanation for the transformation in public opinion about gays, lesbians,
and homosexuality lies with the increasing visibility of gays and lesbians in mass
media. Throughout most of the twentieth century, gays and lesbians were largely
invisible in the media world; when they did appear, the media often presented
them as deviant. Gradually, however, the media began to depict gays and lesbians
more frequently, more positively, and in more diverse ways. (Brewer, 2008 p. 49)

The advent of gay and lesbian television show characters in the 1990s, like Ellen,
portrayed by Ellen DeGeneres, also a lesbian, are central to the notion that as American
society has become increasingly exposed and aware of gays and lesbians because of their
visibility, they have become more tolerant and accepting of them. Brewer points out that
the media and entertainment industry gave America movies like Philadelphia, the gay
winner of the first season of the show Survivor, Richard Hatch, Queer Eye for the
Straight Guy, Will and Grace, and Brokeback Mountain. The increased visibility of gays
and lesbians illustrate the essence of the relationship Brewer seeks to establish, one that
posits that increased visibility of homosexuals in media increase support for homosexuals
and gay rights policies in public opinion polls. Susceptibility to the influence of this form
of media may also be mediated by cohort membership; while an 80 year old may not find
Ru Paul’s Drag Race as appealing as Wheel of Fortune, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to escape the visibility and influence of prominent homosexuals like Rachel
Maddow, Barney Frank, Robin Roberts, Anderson Cooper, Suze Orman, Neil Patrick
Harris, Jason Collins, Tim Cook, or fictional depictions of homosexual characters in
television and movies.
Coupled with Brewer’s hypothesis about increased visibility in media is the
notion that the late 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s brought an increased media attention to
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major gay political, civil, health, and cultural events that centered around homosexuals.
In this way, events like the AIDS and HIV crisis and the heightened risks associated with
homosexual sexual behavior and the beating and murder of Matthew Shepard may have
had a further humanizing impact on the way the public viewed homosexuals, evoking
sympathy, particularly as these tragedies unfolded on television news programs.
Obviously there was also a concurrent backlash during the advent of the AIDS crisis
amongst religious conservatives who advocated the “they deserve it” position,
particularly as it related to the epidemic amongst the gay population. However, when you
add to the public dialogue discussion of the gay conversion movement, policies like
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, and legislative initiatives to fire gay teachers and prohibit their
employment by state governments, the debate transcends a discussion of tragedy and
morality to consideration of concepts like justice and fairness. In other words, scholarly
articles have suggested the possibility that major events in the news concerning gays and
lesbians may have produced a liberalizing effect on public opinion; some have even
suggested that as a result of these events that there was a public opinion backlash
(Baunach, 2011; Becker & Scheufele, 2009; Sherkat et al., 2011).
In their 2009 article, Amy Becker and Dietram Scheufele explore the impact of a
number of potential independent variables on the formation of public opinion on the topic
of gay marriage in an election context. In specific, their focus examined how ideological
predispositions, religious traditions and values, media exposure, and political measures of
tolerance and knowledge may predict support for gay marriage, specifically in an election
context. Becker and Scheufele use opinion survey data collected before 2004 presidential
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election, an election popularly referred to as a referendum on moral values because of the
preponderance of state referenda questions defining marriage. The 2004 presidential
contest also became popularly associated with a moral referendum narrative within the
media because of President Bush’s endorsement of a constitutional amendment that
would have constitutionally defined marriage as between one man and one woman and
his advocacy against the use of stem cell research.
Central to Becker and Scheufele’s examination of public opinion in the context of
the 2004 election are the plausible independent variables on the electorate’s support for
same-sex marriage. Their study begins by exploring the electoral environment in advance
of the November 2004 election. The authors note the popular reference point in many of
the scholarly articles on the topic of support for gay marriage and public opinion, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge. Becker and Scheufele contend
that the November 2003 decision in Massachusetts garnered significant media attention
and highlighted contrasts between Democratic challenger John Kerry and other socially
conservative Republicans, like President Bush. Their analysis proposed to explore
whether those events helped shape the context of the 2004 election and also the contours
of public opinion on gay marriage. Their analysis examines the tempering influence of
ideology and religiosity in approaching the context individual decisions concerning gay
marriage. Scheufele and Becker contend: “...this articles privileges a more complex
examination of the ways in which ideology and religiosity influence the processing of
media content and shape political opinions on morally loaded, controversial issues by
exploring how predispositions can contribute to or attenuate the impacts of individual83

level behaviors or cognitions on political attitudes.” (Becker and Scheufele, 2009)
Through the lens of religious and moral predispositions the authors evaluate public
opinion data to determine their role in shaping opinion when exposed to various forms of
media, issue frames, and varying levels of self-identified political tolerance and political
knowledge. Ultimately, their research underscores some of the more universal truths that
seem to control public opinion formation as measured through survey responses:
religious and value predispositions are common indicators of attitudes toward social
policies, like support for gay marriage. In other words, their work highlights the volume
of scholarly data that discusses the controlling influence of religious and ideological
preferences on opinion and on voting behavior. Further, their research propels the notion
that the pre-existent ideological and religious preferences act as heuristics for the
interpretation of media content. They find that the conservative ideological predisposed
subjects were left largely unaffected by the influence of exposure to campaign exposure
in support of gay marriage. This leads the authors to contend that as party affiliations
diminish, and as people focus their media attention on sources that conform to their
ideological and value-based predispositions, these ideological and religious
predispositions present a greater importance for study in the quest for the source of public
opinion (Becker and Scheufele, 2009). But, left unmentioned in their analysis, is the
surge in media celebrities who increasingly feel comfortable and safe in coming out, like
Shepard Smith, a television host at Fox News. Interestingly, Becker & Scheufele also
present data that suggests that an overriding power of ideological predisposition over the
potential impact of political tolerance and political knowledge. The potential moderating
influence that political tolerance and awareness that the authors anticipated within the
84

study was attenuated by ideological predispositions; the ideological predisposition exists
to a degree that it overrides the potentially positive impact political awareness would
have on support for gay marriage.
Ultimately, the research by Becker and Scheufele highlights a great deal of
preexistent scholarship that underscores the controlling influence of religious and
ideological predispositions on attitudes toward social policy. In particular, their research
undergirds the notion that “controversial moral issues like gay marriage are driven by
individual ideological and religious predispositions in two distinct ways.” (Becker and
Scheufele, 2009) These ways are referenced in the preceding paragraphs and highlight
the way these predispositions influence media interpretation and political inputs on the
formation of opinion. The other way their research is distinct is in the way they find that
these predispositions moderate the variables encountered in the context of electoral
attitudes, with given attention to media environment in the lead-up to the 2004 election.

Literature Review Summary
In total, cohort succession, intracohort change, contact theory, and elite cues are
all part and parcel to the variety of factors that scholars have discovered impact the rapid
change in support for gay rights and same-sex marriage. Support or opposition to samesex marriage is conditioned by a number of interdependent multicorrelated factors like
age, degree of contact or exposure to homosexuals, and exposure to media. Some
explanations, like cohort succession, are more generally accepted and disregarded as the
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most prominent factors at play in changing attitudes towards gay rights. However, in
many ways, my hypotheses are an extension of the alternative explanations concerning
media elite exposure, contact with homosexuals, and intracohort change. After all,
exposure to a campaign to amend a state constitution to define marriage as between “one
man and one woman” will involve entertaining potentially new message frames
concerning equality and fairness, in addition to the older themes concerning morality,
traditional values, and religiosity. Similarly, these newer campaigns involve large groups
of openly gay activists from within the LGBT community, some, perhaps, extending
themselves into the social framework of prospective voters or survey respondents for the
first time. In this context, the public debate, message frames, and elite cues delivered in
the context of a statewide campaign for or against gay rights may be the catalyst for an
instance of intracohort change, closing the complete loop from restriction of rights, to
backlash, and then provision of rights. In Washington’s successful R-74 campaign in
2012, several of the pro marriage equality campaign ads featured prominent statewide
religious leaders and clergy endorsing the notion of marriage equality and fairness for
LGBT Washingtonians in an ad they simply called “Faith” (Washington United for
Marriage, 2012).
Ultimately, the existent academic literature is sufficient to explain the broader
patterns at play in the changing opinion landscape on gay rights, but fails to explore the
mediating factors at the state level where gay rights were initially restricted and have
since, in some states, and at the federal level, come full-circle to advance and provide gay
rights. State institutions play a role in mediating these debates, whether they are state
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courts, federal courts, state legislatures, state attorneys general, or governors- yet no
substantive political science work has been done in this area to examine their role in these
fights. Similarly, no scholarly work has explored the potential relationship that the many
statewide campaigns on gay rights have played on public opinion. My analysis carries
forward the theme of the literature reviewed and aspires to show through preliminary
examination of statewide electoral results, national opinion, and statewide opinion data
that efforts to restrict gay rights have ultimately prodded both state and national opinion
upward toward support for gay rights because of the introduction of new message frames,
media coverage, elite cues, and potential contact with homosexuals.
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Chapter 5: Findings
Below I will discuss the findings for each hypothesis and later discuss the variety
of considerations for each specific hypothesis and consider various factors for the results
across each question and their relevance toward the broader research questions.
H1: In states where issues of gay rights have appeared at the ballot box most frequently,
popular support for gay rights will show a general trend of increased electoral support for
initiatives meant to preserve, provide, or stop the potential restriction of gay rights in the
future, in each successive referenda over time and over the previous electoral event.

As we see in tables 2, 9-11 and figures 3-5 in the Appendix, in all three states
there was a 100% failure rate for Hypothesis 1. No clear linear trends emerge in the
variety of state election results where gay rights questions have been before voters. I
feature Tables 9-11in the Appendix for each state, California, Maine, and Oregon, with
an individual representation of the referenda or ballot initiative on gay rights for each
election within the respective state. I also include Figures 3-5 in the Appendix showing
each individual state’s support for same-sex rights, as re-configured for this analysis,
across all elections. A myriad of established knowledge within the realm of political
science may have predicted that discerning social trends from referenda results across
wide expanses of time, particularly over the course of twenty-five years, would be a
fruitless exercise. Any linear connection I hypothesized to see between the evolution of
increased public debate and a simultaneous increase in support for gay rights was near
non-existent. In Maine, Oregon, and California, public referenda support and opposition
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to gay rights all vacillated between successive elections and the varying specific
questions posed to voters. A variety of factors could account for the lack of conformity to
my first hypothesis: differences in the times and types of elections when the vote was
held, the distinction in questions posed to voters, and the relative contrast in state
demographics to name a few. In California, for instance, three of the four referenda on
gay rights were November elections; only one, Proposition 8, was on a presidential
election year ballot, while Proposition 6 and Proposition 64 were on midterm November
ballots. Similarly, in Maine, only two of the state’s five referenda were taken during the
course of presidential election years. The other three elections in Maine in 1995, 1998,
and 2009 all took place on ballots where there was no federal level election. In Oregon,
however, four of the five referenda on gay rights were on presidential year ballots, when
election participation is generally higher.

H2: National public opinion poll data on support for same-sex marriage should increase
over time as statewide ballot initiatives begin and increase in the United States;
investigation of successive time periods with lesser and higher concentrations of electoral
initiatives on gay civil rights will reveal sharp increases in support as forced democratic
and political dialogue on the topic ensues over time.

The data from national polling firms confirm my second hypothesis. Table 12 in
the Appendix shows the percentage changes for each organization over each period as
divided by electoral activity on gay rights within the states and opinion trends for the
entire 1996-2013 period overall. In each successive period across all polling
organizations, there is increase over the previous period’s lowest support levels for legal
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same-sex marriage. Pew showed an average 4% increase per period from its lowest level
in each successive period. Similarly, Gallup demonstrated an average 6.5% increase
above the minimum level of support from the previous time period. However, the ABC
News and NBC/Wall Street Journal data were too limited to glean similar data because
they only began tracking opinion consistently in 2003 or later. However, the average
percentage changes in support per sample across all organizations are consistently
positive for each successive time period. Each polling report by period shows a positive
uptick in support for legal same-sex marriage over the previous polling organization’s
average percentage change in each sample. For Pew, the average increase per sample
between 1996-2008 (Tables 8b and 8c) is .12% per sample; For Gallup, the average
increase per sample between 1996-2008 is .13% between the same period. Between
2004-2013 (Tables 8c and 8d), Pew registered an average increase between samples
of .046% per sample, Gallup .727%, ABC 2.357%, and NBC/WSJ did not have sufficient
data present in the 2004-2008 period to calculate an average between 2004-2013.
Clearly opinion has become more supportive and thus changed nationwide on the topic of
same-sex marriage. Because there were only five statewide referenda on the topic of
same-sex marriage in the period between 1996-2003, the public may not have been as
engaged, educated, or had reference points for the formation of their opinions on the topic
of same-sex in that seven year period. However, in the final period between 2009-2013
the rate of change was the greatest across all national polling organizations featured in
this study. This result would seem to infer support for my third hypothesis that in the
wake of the increased public debate of the 2004-2008 period, and its 27 statewide
referenda and ballot initiatives, respondents were changing their perspectives on same90

sex marriage at a rate higher than in the previous two periods perhaps as a backlash to the
initial backlash that popularized placement of gay marriage rights on ballots throughout
states in 2004-2008 period.

H3: There will be an increase in the rate of change in support for legal same-sex
marriage in the three states where same-sex marriage referenda have been more
frequent than states where politically culture is similar but has not seen the same
level of referenda incidence on same-sex marriage.

The results of my final hypothesis are inconclusive largely because of the inconsistency
in data available on public opinion at the state level, particularly in states where same-sex
marriage debates have not been frequent outside of national media attention and one
ballot question during the initial public backlash in the period between 2004-2008. As I
note in Table 13, California, Maine, and Oregon all experience positive changes in the
rate of support for same-sex marriage over the final span of time measured between
2009-2013, consistent with national trends. However, when compared between states
with similar political cultures using Elazar’s classification model (for purposes of
featuring a control group), only California demonstrates a consistently larger local rate of
change per year than control group states with more than two years of opinion data
available. A comprehensive depiction of the results is featured in Table 13 of the
Appendix. The results largely suffered because of the dearth of statewide data publicly
available in the earliest years of the period, particularly 2009 and 2010. A wealth of
consistent statewide opinion data begins to emerge in 2010 and in 2011, but before then
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very little consistent poll data is available outside the context of the myriad of statewide
opinion data collected around the referenda on statewide constitutional bans between
1998 and 2012.
The limited number of comparable control group states also complicated the
analysis. While Elazar’s political culture classification model allowed a way to evaluate
states with similar dispositions civically and culturally- the sheer demographic
differences that exist between the states is sufficient enough to help explain why
comparisons between states like California, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Washington will
not be equal. Additionally, Elazar’s model is old and potentially outdated because it has
been in use since 1966 when he first published “American Federalism: A view from the
States”- now more than 48 years ago. Current and past political events in the nation, as
well as within each state, have undoubtedly shaped the contours of the most recent
opinion data available there and may further indict why Elazar’s model may have been a
crude instrument for use in this analysis.
The final hypothesis is inconclusive because of the fluid nature of the same-sex
marriage debate in the universe of states within the United States. States are handling this
salient issue in a number of ways; some legislatures now seem to be taking steps to
legalize same-sex marriage statutorily; others may take no action to propel the provision
of same-sex marriage equality or end constitutional bans on the practive; while another
group of states are leaving activists to litigate the policy in Federal courts or shift the
debate toward statewide popular votes on the issue of authorizing same-sex marriage at
the ballot box via ballot initiative. This dynamic, coupled with a dearth of state level
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polling history, complicates a social scientific approach and ability to compare state
opinion where gay rights battles have been waged more frequently against those states
that are similar in their political culture but not in their familiarity with the public debate
surrounding electoral referenda and initiatives concerning same-sex marriage.

The findings for hypotheses 1 and 3 are largely inconclusive; hypothesis 2 is
confirmed. No clear discernible patterns or trends seem to emerge from the data
examined at the statewide level. However, as the final hypothesis connects to the broader
issue of my research question, statewide opinion data reveals that states that have
wrestled with electoral initiatives concerning gay rights most frequently like California,
Maine, and Oregon seem more likely to be closer in their public opinion toward majority
support for the provision of legal same-sex marriage rather than states who have not and
are similar in their political culture. Further research may reveal that states, in the
aggregate, that have made multiple efforts to restrict gay rights more generally, are in a
better position to support and authorize same-sex marriage in public opinion, as measured
by opinion data, and vis-à-vis their state political institutions.
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Chapter 6: Discussion & Conclusion

The results of this analysis, while largely inconclusive, point toward the
possibility that efforts to restrict gay rights have had an impact on the increasing support
for same-sex marriage. Over and over again, examinations of the rate of support for
same-sex marriage have shown increases in national and statewide polling data over time.
My analysis demonstrates an increase in nationwide public opinion support as statewide
ballot initiatives and referenda increase and generate public debate in conjunction with
Hypothesis 2. Can it be sheer coincidence that the incredible increase in public support
has occurred over the same period when matters of gay rights have been debated and
fought so vociferously at the ballot box, in court cases, in the media, and in political
campaigns? It could be. However, my three-pronged hypotheses based upon my research
question leave significant room for additional debate and potential answers where more
data and thorough empirical quantitative analysis are possible.
Of note within my first hypothesis was that referenda results across all states and
times showed a historical tendency for gay rights to win at the ballot box when marriage
was not involved as a part of the referenda question. Nine of the fourteen referenda
questions were unrelated to same-sex marriage; of those nine, six were victories for gay
rights proponents. In conjunction with some of the scholarly analysis described in the
literature review, it is clear that the public is beginning to demonstrate their willingness to
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re-evaluate their stance toward same-sex marriage as an immutable social institution,
evident through their most recent affirmation of same-sex marriage rights in Maine and
the three other states, Minnesota, Washington, and Maryland who also adopted same-sex
marriage via ballot box in November 2012. Yes, public opinion more and more
consistently demonstrates nation-wide majority support for legal same-sex marriage, but
why? Can there be a definitive connection between the surge in public opinion support
for same-sex marriage and the proliferation of referenda and ballot initiatives primarily
oriented toward the restriction over the last 14 years?
If the data from the states where gay rights questions have been most frequently
posed (California, Maine, and Oregon) is important to my general research question at all,
it may be for the general level of dialogue that has been created in the wake of these
ballot campaigns, the opinion dynamic these campaigns create in the present context, and
any future impact they will have on the same-sex marriage landscape in these states. As
of the writing of this thesis, public opinion in California has consistently demonstrated
majority public support for same-sex marriage since 2010 (Public Policy Institute of
California, 2013). Also relevant to this discussion is California’s relatively new status as
one of the thirteen states that recognize same-sex marriage per the United States Supreme
Court’s refusal to grant standing to the petitioners in Hollingsworth v. Perry; the Court’s
decision essentially paved the way for the same-sex marriage access that now exists in
California.
Because Maine has already adopted same-sex marriage by ballot in 2012 only
Oregon remains as one of the three states where gay rights battles at the ballot box have
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been most frequent. And, again, as of the writing of this thesis, efforts are underway to
push same-sex marriage on the ballot in Oregon in 2014, this time at the behest of gay
rights proponents like Basic Rights Oregon and Oregon United for Marriage. (“Oregon
restarts to reconsider gay marriage”, 2013). It may well be possible that by the end of
2014, all of the states where gay rights have faced the ballot most often will also all offer
access to same-sex marriage. Yet, even though the data and election results do not
demonstrate a consistent up tick in support for gay rights referenda after previous
elections have been held on gay rights, it is worthwhile to note that the states where
public dialogue on the topic has been most frequent may all have legal same-sex marriage
by the end of 2014.
While no clear relationship could be demonstrated between exposure to gay rights
referenda and ballot initiatives and increased public support for subsequent gay rights
referenda or ballot initiatives, evidence supports the notion that support for same-sex
rights increased in national polls in the wake of increased statewide ballot initiatives and
referenda on same-sex marriage. This may be the path of further study that becomes clear
from my research; my literature review and data paint a compelling picture of what
actually might be occurring if such a relationship exists, as I claim, between efforts to
restrict gay rights at the ballot and the relatively recent surge in public support for gay
rights nationwide. I discussed, briefly, the possibility that a version of diffusion may be
occurring at the state level and prodding the nation to focus more attention on issues of
inequality and discrimination where gay rights are concerned. I expect that the new norm
of increased national attention toward the provision of gay rights, in particular, same-sex
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marriage, will continue and play a large role in the advancement of federal litigation
against state constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage and result in a gradual
state-by-state victories for gay rights with ultimate resolution by the United States
Supreme Court. I believe two things could be at play in these developments; diffusion
may be occurring from the state to the national level, where states that have advanced gay
rights, including same-sex marriage, have served as a catalyst for greater national media
attention and dialogue on the subject more generally making it more salient nationally. In
conjunction with the prospect of what I will call “state-to-nation diffusion,” we could also
be witness to a secondary backlash to the initial backlash that spawned efforts to restrict
gay rights at the ballot box in the year 2000. This newest backlash could be in response to
the new frames that have emerged and dominated more contemporary debates about
same-sex marriage and gay rights; these frames, as previously discussed, have focused on
issues like equality, freedom, liberty, and love and have thus shifted from the potentially
more powerful past allure of a morality frame in such campaigns. Is it possible that these
two phenomena, state-to-nation diffusion and a reverse backlash have mediated a recent
return to gay rights debates that have centered on authorizing gay rights rather than
restricting them? More research can be done to uncover the specific role those initiatives
may have played in the formation of additional support as measured in poll data.
Several avenues exist for additional more intensive examination of this dynamic;
the first could utilize methods of disaggregation initially developed by Erikson, Wright,
and McIver (1993). The other seemingly more accurate method is multilevel regression
and poststratification (MRP). According to Justin Phillips and Jeffrey Lax of Columbia
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University, MRP has the ability to “combine the best features of both disaggregation and
simulation techniques. It revives the old simulation method, incorporating demographic
information to improve state estimation, while allowing for nondemographic differences
between states” (Phillips and Lax, 2009). Estimating state public opinion from nationwide poll samples using MRP most recently configured by Park, Gelman, and Bafumi
(2006) would enable a more consistent ability to track public opinion in specific states
over time than by relying on the dearth of publicly available poll data that have differing
poll methodologies and sample sizes. Phillips and Lax also make clear that MRP may be
superior because of its ability to produce results that are as accurate for one large national
poll as it would be for ten or more.
Andrew Flores, Public Opinion Project Director at the Williams Institute at the
University of California- Los Angeles School of Law was helpful to this study for his
feedback on my hypotheses and research question. Flores used MRP in his
comprehensive estimation of public support for same-sex marriage across each individual
state. In his study with Scott Barclay, they found that 12 states and the District of
Columbia at the end of 2012 “had support for same-sex marriage at or above 50%.”
(Flores and Barclay, 2013). Interestingly, of the 12 states that have 50% or more support
for same-sex marriage, all currently perform marriages, civil unions, or domestic
partnerships for same-sex couples. They also note that 13 additional states are currently
within 5 percentage points of majority support for same-sex marriage and estimate that
another eight states will be above 50% support by the end of 2014.
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More than two decades have passed since states began to grapple with electoral
initiatives concerning gay rights. Undoubtedly, over the course of this time period, public
debate on the issue of gay rights, including same-sex marriage, has increased. My
research question aimed to discern whether or not I could establish a clear relationship
between the increase in public debate that surrounds electoral activity on gay rights and
the increased rate of change in public support for gay rights and, more specifically,
support for same-sex marriage. What becomes clear, both through the survey of
academic literature on the reasons behind the change in attitude toward same-sex
marriage, and through my own exploration of the relationship between electoral events
and opinion, is that the reason for the increase in support for same-sex marriage involves
a number of plausible explanations. Whether or not the forced debate of political
campaigns and referenda questions on gay rights or same-sex marriage have advanced
and increased support for the cause of same-sex marriage remains debatable. The data I
have explored helps paint an interesting picture of state-to-nation diffusion and a reverse
backlash that could be corroborated by additional qualitative and quantitative empirical
analysis using the methodologies I described earlier. While I had hoped that my research
question and hypotheses would pave a more concrete connection between these events, a
clear path forward for additional research now exists and may better illuminate the
potential for a connection between the public debate of campaigns to impact public
opinion and increase support for same-sex marriage.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Below, in Table 2, an extrapolation of statewide electoral events concerning gay rights in Maine,
California, and Oregon used in Hypothesis 1.
Year

Topic

Proposition #

Maine Gay Rights Referenda & Ballot Initiatives

1998
2000
2009
2012

Repeal of a nondiscrimination law based
on homosexuality
Ratification of a statute geared toward
protection against discrimination because
of homosexuality
People's veto of statute passed and
signed by governor granting same-sex
marriage
Allows Marriage Licenses for same-sex
couples

1
6
1
1

Source: Maine Secretary of State Office

California Gay Rights Referenda & Ballot Initiatives

Year
1978
1986

Topic

Question #

Attempts ban on employment for
homosexuals in California public
educational system
Classifies AIDS as a communcicable
disease; would require registry and
possible quarantine

6
64

2000

Defines marriage per state statute as
22
between two persons of the opposite sex

2008

Constitutionally eliminates the right of
same-sex couples to marriage

8

Source: California Secretary of State Office

Oregon Gay Rights Referenda & Ballot Initiatives

Year
1988
1992
1994
2000
2004

Topic

Measure #

Revokes ban on discrimination imposed
by governor
Government cannot facilitate, must
discourage homosexuality and other
"behaviors"
Amends constitution: government
cannot approve, create protected
classifications based on homosexuality
Prohibits public school instruction
encouraging, promoting, sanctioning
homosexual and bisexual behavior
Amends constitution: only marriage
between one man and one woman legally
recognized as marriage
Source: Oregon Secretary of State Office
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8
9
12
9
36

Appendix B
Below in Tables 3-5, data utilized in assessment of Hypothesis 2.
Table 3 National Polling Data on Support for Legal Same-Sex Marriage
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Table 4 National Polling Data on Support for Legal Same-Sex Marriage Continued

113

Table 5 National Polling Data on Support for Legal Same-Sex Marriage Continued
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Appendix C
Below, in Tables 6-8, statewide opinion data utilized in the evaluation of hypothesis 3.
Table 6 Statewide Opinion Data Tabulation
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Table 7 Statewide Opinion Data Tabulation
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Table 8 Statewide Opinion Data Tabulation
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Figure 1: Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage

Figure 2: Gender Differences in Attitudes on Gay Marriage
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Table 9 California Gay Rights Ballot Initiatives

Figure 3 Percentage Support for CA Gay Rights
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Table 10 Maine Electoral Events Involving Gay Rights

Figure 4 Percentage Support for Gay Rights in Maine
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Table 11 Oregon Electoral Events Involving Gay Rights

Figure 5 Percentage Support for Gay Rights in Oregon
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Table 12 National Attitudes in Support of Legal Same-Sex Marriage

8a

8b

8c

8d

122

Figure 6 Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage by Age

Figure 7 Hispanics Attitudes Toward Legal Same-Sex Marriage
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Figure 8 White/Black Gap in Support for Same-Sex Marriage

Table 13 Statewide Same-Sex Opinion Comparison Using Elazar Model
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